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Polysemy in Traditional vs. Cognitive Linguistics 
Éva Kovács 
1 Introduction 
Polysemy, the phenomenon whereby a linguistic unit exhibits multiple distinct 
yet related meanings is a very common feature of any language. In fact, almost 
all the words in language are polysemous to a greater or lesser extent. Consider 
such words in English as get, face and nice, etc. Polysemy is justly considered to 
be a necessary means of language economy. As Ullmann (1959:118) puts it, 
“polysemy is an indispensable resource of language economy. It would be 
altogether impracticable to have separate terms for every referent”. 
No wonder polysemy is such a topic of interest in the study and description 
of natural languages, and poses special problems both in semantic theory and 
semantic applications, such as lexicography or translation. Nevertheless, except 
as a source of humour and puns, polysemy is rarely a problem for 
communication among people. In fact, language users select the appropriate 
senses of polysemous words “effortlessly and unconsciously” (Ravin & Leacock 
2000:1). 
A look at the entries for polysemous words in different dictionaries shows 
that polysemy presents a challenge to lexicographers. The traditional 
lexicographic practice is to list multiple dictionary senses for polysemous words 
and to group related ones as sub–senses. However, dictionaries differ in the 
number of senses they define for each word, the grouping into subsenses and the 
content of definitions. It seems that there is little agreement among 
lexicographers as to the degree of polysemy and the way in which the different 
senses are organised (Hollósy 2008:209). 
The lexicographers’ disunity is mirrored in linguistically naive speaker’s 
judgement about polysemous words. Jorgenson (1990:187) asked speakers to 
distinguish senses of highly polysemous words, among others: head (21 
dictionary senses), life (18), world (14), way (12), side (12) and hand (11). The 
author found that the subjects in the test consistently refused to recognise more 
than about three senses, even after being shown the dictionary entries for 
polysemous words that differentiated a dozen or more senses. In Jorgenson’s 
view (1990: 168), dictionary entries for some words “do inflate the number of 
sense categories beyond those normally distinguished by speakers”. One 
difficulty people will have in using the dictionary is in distinguishing major and 
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minor senses, since most dictionaries treat all senses as equally important, which 
is clearly misleading. 
Being very complex, the concept of polysemy poses a challenge for lexical 
semanticists as well. As pointed out by Jackson and Amwela (2007:69), it 
involves a certain number of problems, such as the number of meanings, 
transference of meanings and difficulty in recognizing polysemy as opposed to 
homonymy. 
Since one meaning cannot always be delimitated and distinguished from 
another, we cannot determine exactly how many meanings a polysemous word 
has. Consider the verb eat, which has the following main meanings (Mayor 
2009:535):  
1. to put food in your mouth and chew and swallow it (She was eating an 
ice cream.) 
2. to have a meal (Let’s eat first and then go to the movie.) 
3. to use a very large amount of something (This car eats petrol.) 
However, besides its literal meaning, it is also used in idioms having a 
transferred meaning, such as eat your words (admit that what you said was 
wrong); eat somebody alive (be very angry with someone); I’ll eat my hat; I 
could eat a horse; have somebody eating out of your hand; eat somebody out of 
house and home; and you are what you eat, etc. What is more, in the literal 
sense, we can also distinguish between eating nuts and eating soup, the former 
with fingers and the latter with spoons. If we push this analysis too far, we may 
end up deciding that the verb eat has a different meaning for every type of food 
we eat (Jackson & Amwela 2007:69). Even this example shows that a word may 
have both a ‘literal’ meaning and one or more ‘transferred’ meanings, although 
we cannot determine with precision how many different meanings a given word 
may have altogether. 
Nevertheless, the most puzzling question both lexicographers and lexical 
semanticists are faced with is how to distinguish polysemy from homonymy. As 
generally defined in semantics (Leech 1981:227–229, Lyons 1981:43–47, Lyons 
1995:54–60), homonymy refers to etymologically unrelated words that happen 
to have the same pronunciation and/or spelling (e.g. bank as a financial 
institution and the edge of a river). Conversely, polysemes are etymologically 
and therefore semantically related, and typically originate from 
metaphoric/metonymic usage (e.g. bank as a building and a financial institution). 
The distinction is, however, not always straightforward, especially since words 
that are etymologically related can, over time, drift so far apart that the original 
semantic relation is no longer recognizable, pupil (in a school) and pupil (of the 
eye). 
Homonymy and polysemy often give rise to ambiguity, and context is 
highly relevant to disambiguate the meaning of utterances. Consider the oft–
mentioned example from Lyons, in which the two phenomena appear together 
(Lyons 1977:397): 
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(1) They passed the port at midnight. 
This utterance is lexically ambiguous. However, it would normally be clear in a 
given context which of the two homonyms, port
1
 (‘harbour’) or port2 (‘kind of 
fortified wine’), is being used and also which sense of the polysemous verb 
‘pass’ (‘go past’ or ‘give’) is intended. 
Lexical ambiguity resulting from polysemy and homonymy has also 
attracted the attention of translators for a long time. It is generally assumed in 
translation theory that the disambiguation of contrastive polysemy often depends 
on information pertaining to the context of situation only (Catford 1965, 
Newmark 1988 and Nida 2001, etc.). Lyons (1977:235) also notes that context 
plays a central role in solving problems of translation which arise as a result of 
homonymy or polysemy. If the ambiguity is resolved by the context in which the 
sentence is uttered, it can be correctly interpreted by the hearer, and, in principle, 
correctly translated into another language. 
Furthermore, it has also been demonstrated by some of the linguists 
mentioned above (e.g. Lyons 1977:551–552 and Lipka 1992:136, etc.) that there 
is subjective association involved in making a distinction between polysemy and 
homonymy as well. In other words, there is a good deal of agreement among 
native speakers as to what counts as the one and what counts as the other in 
particular instances. However, there are also very many instances about which 
native speakers will hesitate or be in disagreement. 
Finally, as is referred to above, homonymy and polysemy are often the 
basis of a lot of word play, usually for humorous effects. In the nursery rhyme 
Mary had a little lamb, we think of a small animal, but in the comic version, 
Mary had a little lamb, some rice and vegetables, we think of a small amount of 
meat. The polysemy of lamb allows two interpretations. However, we make 
sense of the riddle Why are trees often mistaken for dogs? by recognising the 
homonymy in the answer: Because of their bark (Yule 2006:107–108). 
In the light of all these problems related to polysemy it is understandable 
why it has been so widely discussed in the literature. In fact, we can make a 
distinction between two different approaches in their treatment. While traditional 
grammarians such as Lyons (1977, 1981, 1995), Leech (1981), Cowie (1982), 
Lipka (1992) and Jackson & Amwela (2007), etc. assume that polysemy is a 
characteristic of only word meaning, cognitive linguists (Lakoff 1987, Tyler & 
Evans 2003, Croft & Cruse 2004, Evans & Green 2006 and Evans 2007, etc.) 
challenged this view by regarding polysemy as a category of other areas of 
language, such as morphology, phonology and syntax. This paper sets out to 
compare these two opposing approaches. Thus the primary aim of this study is 
twofold. First, I will look at how polysemy is treated in traditional approaches 
showing primarily what attempts were made to differentiate polysemy from 
homonymy and what the drawbacks of the criteria suggested for this were. 
Second, I will highlight the new approach to polysemy in cognitive linguistics. 
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2 Polysemy in traditional approaches 
The term polysemy is derived from the Greek poly– meaning ‘many’ and sem– 
meaning ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’. Thus the roots of the study of the complex 
relations between words and meanings lie in Greek philosophy. However, as was 
pointed out by Siblot (1995:24), Aristotle was highly critical of polysemy. 
“Words of ambiguous meanings”, he claimed, “are chiefly useful to enable the 
sophist to mislead his learners”. Later, the majority of philosophers denounced 
polysemy and considered it “a defect of language and a handicap to 
communication, understanding and even clear thinking” (Ullmann 1959:167). 
Concrete research into the multiplicity of meaning only began in the 18th 
century and was continued into the 19th century by linguists interested in 
meaning from the point of view of etymology, historical lexicography or 
historical semantics (Nerlich & Clarke 1997:351). In fact, the origin of the term 
polysemy used in linguistics dates back to 1897 when Michel Bréal (1897:145) 
introduced it in his Essai de Sémantique as follows: 
Le sens nouveau, quel qu’il soit ne met pas fin à l’ancien. Ils existent 
tous les deux l’un à coté de l’autre. Le même terme peut s’employer 
tour à tour au sens propre ou au sens métaphorique, au sens restreint ou 
au sens étendu, au sens abstrait ou au sens concret … à mesure qu’une 
signification nouvelle est donnée au mot, il a l’air de se multiplier et de 
produire des exemplaires nouveaux, semblables de forme, différents de 
valeur. Nous appelons ce phénomène de multiplication la polysémie. 
In this passage, Bréal argues that polysemy occurs when a word denotes a new 
sense together with the old one. The word usage will vary between a basic sense 
and a metaphoric sense, a restricted sense and an extended sense and between an 
abstract sense and a concrete sense. He adds that any new signification assigned 
to a particular word is more likely to produce, in turn, other new signification to 
be assigned to the same word. It is worth noting that in his description of 
polysemy, Bréal considers that polysemy is an open–ended and quite productive 
phenomenon in language. 
In the course of the 20th century, the focus of linguistic studies, in general, 
changed from a diachronic perspective to a synchronic perspective. However, 
polysemy played only a minor role in the structuralist tradition. In the theory of 
semantics developed by Katz & Fodor (1963) and Katz (1972), the issue of 
polysemy did not receive much attention. For one thing, Katz (1972) did not 
distinguish polysemy from homonymy, more importantly, he took “the one 
form–one meaning approach” (Cuyckens & Zawada 2001:xii). Accordingly, 
polysemy was maximally restricted and bringing as many different senses under 
one semantic definition was given preference. In fact, polysemy was largely 
regarded as the unusual case, with monosemy and homonymy being regarded as 
the norm. Still several linguists (Leech 1981, Lyons 1977, 1981, 1995 and Lipka 
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1992, etc.) did explore polysemy focussing primarily on the differences between 
polysemy and homonymy. They recognised that the various senses of a 
polysemous word could be derived from a basic sense but did not go further than 
that. Besides, in these traditional approaches, polysemy is restricted to the study 
of word–meaning. The lexical semanticists mentioned above use it to describe 
words like body, which has a range of distinct meanings. Consider some of its 
different meanings (Mayor 2009:172): 
(2) a My fingers were numb and my whole body ached. 
b The dog found the body of a girl in the woods. 
c Nick had bruises on his face and body. The bird has a small body and 
long wings. 
d Workers at the factory are making steel bodies for cars. 
e The arguments are explained in the body of the text. 
f The British Medical Association is the doctors’ professional body. 
The word body is a typical example of polysemy as its different senses are 
related both semantically and historically. Body in the following examples can 
refer to the physical structure of a person or animal (a), a corpse (b), the central 
part of a person or animal’s body not including the head, arms, legs, wings (c), 
the main structure of a vehicle not including the engine, wheels, etc. (d), the 
main or central part of something (e) or a group of people working together to do 
a particular job (f). Historically, it goes back to OE bodiġ (Onions 1966:104). 
As is mentioned above, traditional linguists (e.g. Leech 1981, Lyons, 1981, 
1995, Lipka 1992 and Jackson & Amwela, 2007, etc.) usually treated polysemy 
together with homonymy. In their view, although they have the same shape, 
homonyms are considered distinct lexemes, mainly because they have unrelated 
meanings and different etymologies. In fact, homonyms have two types: 
homographs (same spelling), e.g. lead (metal) and lead (dog’s lead) and 
homophones (same sound), e.g. right, rite and write. 
In traditional approaches, there have been several criteria suggested to 
distinguish between homonymy and polysemy (Lipka 1992:135–39, Lyons 
1981:43–47, Lyons 1977: 550–552, Lyons 1995:54–60 and Jackson & Amwela 
2007:68–71). They are as follows: 
1. formal identity or distinctness 
2. etymology 
3. close semantic relatedness 
However, as pointed out by the above linguists, none of these criteria seems to 
be satisfactory for distinguishing between polysemy and homonymy.  
2.1 Formal identity or distinctness 
As for their formal properties, polysemous words have the same form with a 
range of different but related meanings, e.g. plain (obvious, clear, simple, not 
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beautiful, etc.), while homonyms can show differences in spelling, e.g. hoarse 
(speaking in a low rough voice) and horse (animal) or threw (the past form of 
throw) and through (from one side to the other), and pronunciation, e.g. tear 
[teə] ~ ‘rip’, tear [tɪə] ~ ‘a drop of salty liquid that comes out of your eye when 
you are crying’ or wind [wɪnd] ~ ‘moving air’ and wind [wɑɪnd] ~ ‘turn 
something several times’ as well. 
As for homonymy, some linguists, such as Lyons (1981:43–47, 1995:54–
60) make a distinction between absolute homonymy and various kinds of partial 
homonymy. Absolute homonymy must satisfy the following three conditions: 
1. their forms must be unrelated in meaning 
2. all their forms must be identical 
3. identical forms must be syntactically equivalent 
Absolute homonymy is common enough: bank
1
 (a financial institution), bank
2
 
(the edge of a river); bark
1
 (the sound of a dog), bark
2
 (the skin of a tree); ball
1
 
(a round object), ball
2
 (a large formal occasion at which people dance). 
Obviously, in the above words there does not exist any semantic relationship 
between the two meanings, which is a necessary requirement of a polysemous 
lexeme. 
In such cases, however, because of the sameness of shape of homonyms, 
there is a “danger of homonymous conflict or clash” in the sense that two 
homonyms with totally different meanings may both make sense in the same 
utterance, where the context plays a decisive role in identifying the relevant 
meaning of the homonym in question (Jackson & Amwela 2007:72): 
(3) a The route was very long. 
The root was very long. 
b Helen didn’t see the bat. (animal) 
Helen didn’t see the bat. (long wooden stick) 
Besides absolute homonymy, there are many different kinds of partial 
homonymy as well (Lyons 1981:43–47, 1995:54–60). One such kind of 
homonymy is illustrated by found. The form found is shared by ‘find’ and 
‘found’, but they have different forms, such as finds, finding or founds, founding, 
etc. and found as a form of ‘find’ is not syntactically equivalent to found as a 
form of ‘found’. As pointed out by Lyons, it is particularly important to note the 
condition of syntactic equivalence. Although found as a form of ‘find’ is not 
syntactically equivalent to found as a form of ‘found’, it is in both cases a verb 
form. There are certain contexts in which found may be construed, syntactically, 
in either way. Consider the following example: 
(4) They found hospitals and charitable institutions. 
This sentence is ambiguous, but its ambiguity is lexical: it depends upon a 
difference in the meaning of found (establish) and find (get by searching). This 
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example also shows that context is highly relevant to disambiguate the meaning 
of utterances. 
However, in Lyons’ view (1981:44), it is quite possible for partial 
homonymy never to result in ambiguity. For example, the partial homonymy of 
the adjective last (previous) and the verb last (continue to exist) rarely produces 
ambiguity. Consider the following example: 
(5) It happened last week. 
Bricks last a long time. 
Lyons also refers to another kind of homonymy which is often not recognized in 
standard treatments. For example, the words rung and ring are partial homonyms 
as in 
(6) A rung of the ladder was broken. 
The bell was rung at midnight. 
In Lyons’ view (1981:44), it represents a kind of partial homonymy that “does 
not necessarily involve identity of either the citation–forms or the underlying 
stem–forms of the lexemes in question”. 
In some cases of homonymy, besides the difference in meaning and in 
spelling/pronunciation, the syntactic aspects must also be taken into 
consideration (Lyons 1981:43–47, 1995:54–60, Lipka 1992:136 and Jackson & 
Amwela 2007:72, etc.). Thus homonyms may also be kept apart by syntactic 
differences, i.e. they belong to different word classes. Consider the following 
examples (Mayor 2009:128–129): 
(7) a A bear is a large strong animal with thick hair. 
b Please don’t leave me. I couldn’t bear it. 
In sum, there are various safeguards against any possibility of confusion 
between homonymous words: the difference in spelling, the difference in 
meaning, the difference in overall context and the difference in word class. In 
the case of homonymous words that belong to the same word class and have the 
same spelling, etymology might help as well. 
2.2 Etymology 
Consider bat, the homonymous noun mentioned in example (3), the two 
meanings of which have a different historical origin: 
(8) bat 1. (club, stick) OE. batt; 2. mouse-like winged quadruped ME. 
backe, bakke (Onions 1966:78) 
Similarly, the word ear with the meanings ‘organ of hearing’ and ‘head of corn’ 
are distinguished as homonyms because they were formally distinct in Old 
English and thus have a different etymology: OE. ēare = organ of hearing; OE.; 
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ēar = spike of corn (Onions 1966:297). Consequently, bat1,2 and ear1,2 should be 
treated as two separate words in dictionaries, which is not always the case. 
In contrast, on the basis of their shared etymology, the words pupil
1
 (a child 
at school) and pupil
2
 (the small black round area in the middle of your eye) 
should be treated as polysemes (Onions 1966:724): 
(9) pupil: (O)F. pupille, L. pūpillus, –illa orphan, ward, secondary dim. of 
pūpus boy, pūpa girl 
pupil: (O)F. pupille, L. pūpilla, secondary dim. of pūpa girl, doll, pupil 
of the eye 
Similarly, flower ‘part of a plant’ and flour ‘powder made by milling grain’ 
should also be treated as a single polysemous word. In fact, they are 
etymologically identical, since both go back to the same Middle English word 
flour (OF. flour): A) reproductive organs of plants B) pulverised form of a 
chemical substance (Onions 1966:346). In spite of the different spelling, both are 
pronounced identically in present-day English. They are considered as two 
different words not only by speakers but in dictionaries as well, i.e. they are 
homonyms. 
As is noted by Lyons (1977:551–552), in practice, however, the 
etymological criterion is not always decisive. First of all, there are many words 
in English about whose historical derivation people are uncertain. Secondly, it is 
not always clear what is meant by etymological relationship in this context. The 
lexeme port
1
 (meaning ‘harbour’) derives from the Latin ‘portus’. Port2 
(meaning ‘strong, sweet Portuguese wine’), on the other hand, came into English 
fairly recently and derives from the name of the city in Portugal from which the 
particular kind of wine it denotes was exported. But the name of this city Oporto 
derives in Portuguese from an expression (O Porto), which originally meant, 
simply, ‘the harbour’; and the Portuguese porto comes from the same Latin 
lexeme from which the English port
1
 derives (Onions 1966:699–670). Thus, 
whether we say that port
1
 and port
2
 are etymologically related, depends on how 
far we are prepared to trace the history of words. 
Lipka (1992:136) also refers to some other pairs of words with the same 
origin, such as glamour and grammar, catch and chase, shirt and skirt, etc., 
which are listed as different entries in dictionaries. Not surprisingly, most native 
speakers do not possess any etymological knowledge about them. Thus 
etymology is irrelevant for a purely semantic analysis of some English words: 
(10) glamour (magic, spell XVIII; magic beauty XIX. orig. Sc., alteration 
of GRAMMAR (Onions 1966:400) 
catch obsolete chase; capture, grasp, seize; take, get, receive XIII. 
ME. cacche–n ~ AN., ONF. cachier (Onions 1966:152) 
shirt undergarment for the trunk. OE sćyrte, corr. formally to LG. 
schörte, MDu schorte, G. schürze apron, ON. skyrta (whence SKIRT), 
based on Germ. skurt–SHORT (Onions 1966:821) 
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As is evident from the above examples, the criterion of etymological relationship 
is not always as straightforward as it might appear at first sight. Furthermore, 
etymology can also be misleading as native speakers often consider two lexemes 
derived from different roots in an earlier stage of language as related. 
2.3 Close semantic relatedness 
Another criterion to distinguish homonymy from polysemy is the unrelatedness 
vs. relatedness of meaning, i.e. the native speakers’ feeling that certain meanings 
are connected and others are not. In contrast to homonymous words, polysemous 
words are considered to be semantically related and we can witness a semantic 
transfer, i.e. metaphor or metonymy between them. Thus semantic relatedness is 
an important factor for identifying polysemous words. The words for parts of the 
body provide the best illustration of this (Mayor 2009:791–792, 605–606, 677–
678, 996, 1860, 602): 
(11) hand: hand
1
 (part of a body), hand
2
 (help), hand
3
 (control), hand
4
 
(worker), hand
5
 (hand of a clock) 
face: face1 (front of your head), face
2
 (person: new/different/familiar 
face) face
3
 (mountain/cliff: the north face of Mont Blanc, the cliff 
face), face
4
 (clock: the face of a clock) 
foot: foot
1
 (body part), foot
2
 (bottom part: the foot of the stairs, 
mountain) 
leg: leg
1
 (body part), leg
2
 (meat: roast leg of lamb) leg
3
 (furniture: the 
leg of the table), leg
4
 (clothing: the legs of my jeans) 
tongue: tongue1 (mouth), tongue
2
 (language: mother tongue), tongue
3
 
(food: the tongue of a cow), tongue
4
 (shoe: the tongue of a shoe) 
eye: eye
1
 (body part), eye
2
 (way of seeing/understanding: a critical 
eye), eye
3
 (needle: the eye of the needle), eye
4
 (camera: the eye of the 
camera) 
Other good examples of the semantic relatedness of polysemous words are 
nouns denoting animals (Mayor 2009:691, 1163, 278, and 1140). Consider the 
following examples: 
(12) fox: fox
1
 (wild animal), fox
2
 (person as crafty as a fox) fox
3
 (fur of a 
fox) and fox
4
 (AmE Inf. someone who is sexually attractive). 
snake: snake
1
 (an animal), snake
2
 (someone who cannot be trusted) 
chicken: chicken
1
 (a common farm bird), chicken
2
 (meat), chicken
3
 
(informal coward) 
mouse: mouse
1
 (small animal), mouse
2
 (computer: a small object 
connected to the computer), mouse
3
 (informal a quiet, nervous 
person) 
Having a closer look at the different meanings of the above words, we can notice 
a transfer of meaning: part of a body can be extended to other objects and a 
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character of an animal can be extended to a person. In fact, metaphorical 
creativity is part of everyone’s linguistic competence. However, people are 
generally not aware of the relation between the central and the extended 
meanings of polysemous words. 
Nevertheless, as is generally accepted by traditional linguists (Lipka 
1992:139, Lyons 1977:551–552, 1981:45 and Leech 1981:227), psychological 
criteria, i.e. subjective associations are also involved in determining semantic 
relatedness in polysemy. As Leech puts it (1981:227), relatedness of the senses 
can be “historical or psychological”. Accordingly, as is also mentioned above in 
2.2, two meanings are historically related if they can be traced back to the same 
source, or if the one meaning can be derived from the other. Two meanings are 
considered to be psychologically related if present–day users of the language 
“feel intuitively that they are related, and therefore tend to assume that they are 
different uses of the same word” (Leech 1981:227). 
Consider mess (old fashioned dish of food; dirty or untidy state of affairs) 
and crane (type of bird; machine for lifting), the meanings of which are 
historically related, but psychologically they are not (Onions 1966:571; 224): 
(13) mess – portion or serving of food, dish of food XIII; made dish XV; 
mixed food for an animal XVIII; medley, confused or shapeless mass 
XIX 
crane – large bird OE; machine for raising and lowering weights XIV. 
OHG. krano (G. kran machine), OE. cranoc OHG chranuch (G. 
kranich bird) 
Another much quoted example is the noun sole: sole
1
 (the bottom surface of the 
foot), sole
2
 (the flat bottom part of a shoe) and sole
3
 (a flat fish) (Mayor 
2009:1673). They are related to L. solea (sandal), from solum (bottom, sole of 
the foot) and French sole, with the fish being named so because of its shape 
(Onions 1966:844). 
In contrast, according to Leech (1981:227), there are cases where 
historically unrelated forms are felt to be related psychologically. It, however, 
occurs less frequently. Consider ear (organ of hearing; ear of corn) or weeds 
(wild, useless plants; mourning garments worn by widows). In both these cases 
the etymologies of the two meanings are quite different (Onions 1966:297, 997): 
(14) a ear (organ of hearing) OE. ēare (compare Latin auris ‘ear’) 
ear (spike of corn) OE. ēar (compare Latin acus, aceris ‘husk’) 
b weed (wild useless plant) OE. wēod (weed) 
weeds (morning garments word by widows) OE. wæd (garment) 
Nevertheless, people sometimes see a metaphorical connection between certain 
words, and adjust their understanding of the words accordingly. Thus what from 
a historical point of view is an instance of homonymy, resulting from an 
accidental convergence of forms, becomes reinterpreted in the context of 
present–day English as a case of polysemy. 
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Lyons (1977:551–552, 1981:45) also refers to the less common converse 
situation, where “historically unrelated meanings are perceived by native 
speakers as having the same kind of connection as the distinguishable meanings 
of a single polysemous lexeme”. The example given by Lyons is the noun shock. 
He points out that today a number of people assume that shock
1
 as in ‘shock of 
corn’ (a pile of sheaves of corn) is the same as shock2 as in ‘shock of hair’ (a 
very thick mass of hair). Yet historically, they have different origins (Onions 
1966:822). This example also demonstrates that what, from a historical point of 
view, is quite clearly homonymy will be sometimes reinterpreted by later 
generations of speakers as polysemy. Nevertheless, etymology supports the 
average native speaker’s intuitions about relatedness of meaning although they 
are often not knowledgeable about it. 
All these problems led traditional linguists (Lipka 1992, Cowie 1982 Lyons 
1977, 1981, etc.) to conclude that the reason why it is often not easy to 
distinguish clearly between homonymy and polysemy is due to the fact that they 
are not absolute opposites and there are various degrees of formal and semantic 
unity. Thus they must be regarded as “two end-points of a scale with a 
continuum in between” (Lipka 1992:139). 
Cowie (1982:51) also formulated the distinction between polysemy and 
homonymy in a similar way: 
Polysemous words can differ considerably according to the degree of 
relatedness and difference which their meanings display …, 
homonymy (total distinctness of the meaning of identical forms) is 
properly seen as the end-point of the continuum. 
Similarly, Lyons (1977:551–552, 1981:45) also argues that the border–line 
between polysemy and homonymy is sometimes “fuzzy as even native speakers 
often hesitate or are in disagreement about it in certain situations”. Some native 
speakers will claim to see a connection between the different senses of 
polysemous words, whereas other native speakers deny that any such connection 
exits. 
All these views suggest that the native speaker’s intuitions of the 
relatedness of meaning in deciding between polysemy and homonymy seem not 
to be reliable. Although etymology in general supports the native speaker’s 
intuitions about particular lexemes, it is not uncommon for lexemes which the 
average speaker of the language thinks of as being semantically unrelated to 
have come from the same source. 
All in all, these traditional approaches to polysemy provide a more or less 
successful analysis of what polysemy and homonymy are: what lexical items are 
polysemous and homonymous. Their major problem, however, is that they fail to 
address several fundamental issues: the reasons why these lexical items have 
several senses attached to them, how their meanings are structured, whether 
there is any motivation for the lexical item to convey specific meanings and 
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whether besides lexis, other areas of language exhibit polysemy as well. In fact, 
these issues neglected by traditional approaches are at the core of investigation 
in Cognitive Semantics. 
3. Polysemy in cognitive linguistics 
It is widely acknowledged that the advent of cognitive linguistics in the 1980s 
brought a new approach to polysemy as well (Lakoff 1987, Tyler & Evans 2003, 
Nerlich et al. 2003, Croft & Cruse 2004, Evans & Green 2006 and Evans 2007). 
In general, cognitive linguists place central importance on the role of meaning, 
conceptual processes and embodied experience in the study of language and the 
human mind and the way in which they intersect. With their focus on linguistic 
categorisation, as well as with its view that meaning is central to and motivates 
linguistic structure, the question of polysemy was placed centre–stage again. 
This change in perspective was facilitated by new theories of how humans 
establish categories on the basis of prototypes and family resemblance. The 
word itself with its network of polysemous senses came to be regarded as a 
category in which the senses of the word are related to each other by means of 
general cognitive principles such as metaphor, metonymy, generalization, 
specification and image schema transformations. 
Thus, within the cognitive framework, the main distinction between 
polysemy and homonymy is the systematic relationship of meanings that take 
place in polysemy. Cognitive linguists argue that the meanings of polysemous 
words are related in a systematic and natural way forming radial categories 
where one or more senses are more prototypical (central) while others are less 
prototypical (peripheral). It is assumed that the figurative senses of polysemous 
words are derived metaphorically from the more prototypical spatial senses 
(Lakoff 1987:418–439). In this view, metaphor is understood as an 
experientially–based mapping between a concrete source domain and an abstract 
target domain (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:5). 
Furthermore, unlike traditional research into polysemy inside historical and 
lexical semantics, cognitive analyses go beyond words and polysemy is regarded 
as a cognitive organising principle shared by other areas of language, such as 
morphology, phonology and syntax (Lakoff 1987, Tyler & Evans 2003, Croft & 
Cruse 2004, Evans & Green 2006 and Evans 2007). 
Next let us see how the distinct areas of language, such as the lexicon, 
morphology and syntax exhibit polysemy. As for word meaning, over, which has 
been widely discussed by cognitive linguists, can serve as evidence for 
polysemy at the level of lexical organisation (Taylor 2003:110–116, Lakoff 
1987:418–439, Tyler & Evans 2003:724–765, Evans & Green 2006:328–361). 
Consider the following examples which illustrate various senses of over: 
(15) a The picture is over the sofa. ABOVE 
b The picture is over the hole. COVERING 
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c The ball landed over the wall.  ON THE OTHER SIDE 
d The car drove over the bridge. ACROSS 
e The bath overflowed. EXCESS 
f The government handed over power. TRANSFER 
g She has a strange power over me. CONTROL 
As is argued by the cognitive linguists mentioned above, while each sense of 
over is distinct, they can all be related to one another; they all derive from a 
central ‘above’ meaning via metaphorisation. The TRANSFER sense suggests 
that not just physical objects but abstract notions such as power can be 
transferred and the CONTROL sense is licenced by the metaphor CONTROL IS 
UP. 
Just as words like over exhibit polysemy, so do morphological categories. It 
can be illustrated by the diminutives (Taylor 2003, Lehrer 2003, Evans & Green 
2006 and Kovács 2011, etc.). Diminutives are affixes denoting small size, such 
as young age and small quantity. In addition, there are extensions to meanings of 
affection and pejoration. As pointed out by the above authors, the meaning of 
small easily shifts to endearment – the affection we feel for small children and 
small animals and also to pejoration, since small can denote “lesser” importance. 
While it is a very productive feature of Hungarian and Italian, English has fewer 
diminutives and their productivity is much more limited. Although booklet can 
be glossed as a little book, anklet is not a little ankle (ankle chain, or ankle 
bracelet, is an ornament worn around the ankle). However, the suffix –let still 
connotes small size, e.g. a hamlet is a small town, but the base ham has no 
independent identifiable sense. Starlet refers to a young actress who plays small 
parts in films and hopes to become famous.  
Besides having a diminutive meaning, the suffix –ette is a feminine marker 
as well. Consider dinette (a small space within a dwelling, usually alongside a 
kitchen, used for informal dining), kichette (a small area off the kitchen for 
casual dining), kitchenette (a small cooking area), luncheonette (a small 
restaurant serving light lunches, statuette (a small statue), launderette (a self–
service laundry) vs. usherette (a woman working in a cinema, showing people to 
their seats) and majorette (a girl who spins a baton while marching with a band). 
Similarly, the suffix –kin can refer to smallness, such as in napkin (1. a 
piece of material (as cloth or paper) used at table to wipe the lips or fingers and 
protect the clothes, 2: a small cloth or towel), but also to endearment such as in 
babykins (a term of endearment, resulting from intense attachment to an 
individual and deep concern for their well–being, “How’s your cold, 
Babykins?”). 
The suffix –ling can also mean smallness (duckling, sapling) but with the 
exception of darling meaning endearment, it is affectionately pejorative, such as 
in weakling, giftling (trivial gift), witling (one with small wit) and trifling 
(unimportant or of little value). However, starling refers to a very common bird 
with shiny black feathers that lives especially in cities.  
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The suffix –y/ie refers to both small size and is also used in babytalk, such 
as in doggy, blankie, drinky, horsey and tummy, etc. However, it is more 
productively used for nicknames, which suggest endearment, such as Jimmy, 
Tommy and Susie, etc. 
In Taylor’s view (2003:174) the extension of the diminutive to express an 
attitude of affection or pejoration is an instance of metonymic/metaphoric 
transfer. Thinking of entities with a small size can evoke a range of different 
attitudes. Small things can be regarded with affection or contempt. 
Just as lexical and morphological categories exhibit polysemy, so do 
syntactic categories. Consider the ditransitive construction: SVOO, which has a 
range of abstract meanings associated with it as illustrated by the following 
examples (Evans & Green 2006:37–38): 
(16) a Mary gave John the cake. 
b Mary promised John the cake. 
c Mary refused John the cake. 
d Mary left John the cake. 
e Mary permitted John the cake. 
f Mary baked John the cake. 
In (16)a AGENT successfully causes recipient to receive PATIENT; in (16)b 
conditions of satisfaction imply that AGENT causes recipient to receive 
PATIENT; in (16)c AGENT causes recipient not to receive PATIENT; in (16)d 
AGENT acts to cause recipient to receive PATIENT at some future point of 
time; in (16)e AGENT enables recipient to receive PATIENT; and in (16)f 
AGENT intends to cause recipient to receive PATIENT. While each of the 
abstract senses associated with ditransitive syntax are distinct, they are clearly 
related: they all concern volitional transfer although the nature of transfer varies 
from sense to sense. 
It should be apparent from the foregoing discussion that cognitive linguists 
view polysemy as a key to generalisation across a range of ‘distinct’ phenomena 
and argue that polysemy reveals important fundamental commonalities between 
lexical, morphological and syntactic organisation. Scholars (Lakoff 1987, Taylor 
2003, Nerlich et al. 2003, Tyler & Evans 2003, Lehrer 2003 and Evans & Green 
2006, etc.) working in this area assume that polysemy is a conceptual rather than 
purely linguistic phenomenon, i.e. linguistic polysemy patterns reflect, and 
therefore reveal, systematic differences and patterns in the way linguistic units 
are organised and structured in the mind. 
4 Conclusion 
Polysemy provides a problem that has attracted a great deal of attention in 
semantic analysis. In traditional approaches represented by Leech 1981, Lyons 
1981, 1995, Lipka 1992 and Jackson & Amwela 2007, etc., polysemy is usually 
discussed in conjunction with homonymy. If two lexical items have either 1) 
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etymologically distinct meanings or 2) semantically unrelated meanings, they 
are regarded as homonyms. In contrast, if the meanings concerned are related by 
metaphorical extension – the most typical manifestation of semantic 
interrelationship – or via some other process of semantic development, they are 
considered to be one single lexeme with two senses. Several criteria have been 
suggested to distinguish polysemy from homonymy, such as the formal identity 
or distinctness, etymology and close semantic relatedness, but none of them 
seems to be satisfactory. Furthermore, in traditional approaches polysemy is 
assumed to be a property of lexical categories only. 
In contrast, in cognitive linguists’ view (e.g. Lakoff 1987, Tyler & Evans 
2003, Taylor 2003, Nerlich et al. 2003, Croft & Cruse 2004 and Evans & Green 
2006, etc.), the notion of polysemy is essentially extended and is applied to both 
lexical and grammatical language levels. It is argued that polysemy regulates 
and systematizes both lexis and grammar and may be considered as a factor 
which is organizing the language system. Thus polysemy is considered to be a 
fundamental feature of human language. 
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Computerised Text Analysis Tools  
and Translation Quality  
Albert Vermes 
This paper aims to show how computerised text analysis tools, 
along with the familiar word processing and spreadsheet 
applications, may aid the translator in identifying some key features 
of the source text before starting the translation and in producing 
and checking the target text. It is argued that such an approach may 
contribute to improving the quality of translations. 
1. Introduction 
Modern computerised translation tools like terminology management systems, 
translation memories or integrated translation environments can contribute a lot 
to improving the quality of translations, especially in a corporate or institutional 
setting. However, these tools are at present still relatively expensive, so it is not 
likely that many freelance translators with limited income are happy to invest in 
acquiring such tools. Fortunately, there are many free text analysis software 
tools available now, which can also be put to use in improving the quality of 
translation work. My aim in this paper is to sketch a translation workflow 
scenario that freelancers can use as a method of translation quality assurance. 
Apart from the tools that the translator is certain to have anyway, such as a word 
processor or a spreadsheet application, this method only involves the use of text 
analysis software that comes free of charge. This way I aim to prove that even 
part-time translators can do much to assure the quality of their translations with 
no extra investment required. 
2. Aspects of translation quality 
Based on the ISO 8402 standard, translation quality may be defined as the 
totality of characteristics of a target text that influence whether it can satisfy 
certain stated and implied needs. What this means, as Mossop (2001: 6) points 
out, is that the quality of a translation is always relative to the needs it is aimed 
to serve. One aspect of quality is the adequacy of the translation with respect to 
the target communication situation. But the definition above also means that 
these needs include not only those that are explicitly stated by the client but also 
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those that are merely implied by the task. The most important such implied need 
in translation is accuracy, because target readers will naturally assume that the 
translation is accurate. Accuracy in translation involves correctness of the target 
text with respect to the content and form of the source text and, also, the target 
language. 
Accuracy of content (meaning) is commonly termed equivalence. But 
accuracy of content also depends on whether the target text has preserved all the 
information contained in the original. This requirement is referred to as 
completeness of content. Thirdly, accuracy also means that the translation 
preserves the consistency of the original on three levels: the terminology 
employed, the register of language use, including the phraseology used, and the 
style of language use with respect to the intended readership. Consistency can be 
thought of as an internal property of the text, but we can also talk about it as an 
external property, relating a text to other, similar texts (Kis and Mohácsi-Gorove 
2008: 73). 
Formal accuracy means two things. One is that the translation is divided 
into sections, paragraphs, often (though not necessarily) even sentences, in the 
same way as the original. This may be called the conformity of division 
requirement. The other is the requirement that translation and original should be 
characterised by identity of typography. 
Accuracy with respect to the target language also involves two 
requirements. The first is that the translation is grammatically correct and the 
second is that it reads as easily as any target language text that is not a 
translation. These requirements may be referred to as grammaticality and 
readability. Readability of course is a rather fuzzy notion, but in general we can 
say that it depends on whether the text is written in clear, unambiguous, easy-
flowing language. 
To summarise, the target text, on the one hand, is expected to be adequate 
for a given purpose in a given situation and, on the other hand, it is also 
expected, implicitly if not explicitly, to satisfy the following accuracy 
requirements: 
 
(1) Content 
  Requirement of equivalence 
  Requirement of completeness 
  Requirement of consistency 
 
(2) Form 
 Requirement of conformity of division 
 Requirement of identity of typography 
 
(3) Language 
 Requirement of grammaticality 
 Requirement of readability 
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3. Method of quality assurance 
Contrary to what many people think, translation quality assurance does not take 
place after the translation has been produced. It begins before the translation is 
started. The obvious first step is to read the source text (ST) to gain an 
understanding of its content. Second, technical terms in the text need to be 
identified and target language equivalents established. Third, recurring phrases 
need to be spotted that typify the given text or genre and their equivalents 
established. With these lists of terms and phrases ready, the actual translation 
process can begin. 
When the first draft of the target text (TT) is done, it has to be revised. 
Following Mossop (2001: 165), revision in translation can be defined as the 
process of checking a draft translation for errors and making the appropriate 
amendments. Revision is mainly a bilingual operation consisting in a 
comparison of the first draft with the original. The reviser has to check whether 
the information in the original is carried through in the translation precisely and 
completely (nothing less and nothing more), the terminology and phraseology is 
accurate, numbers, measures, dates, etc. are precise, chapters, sections, 
paragraphs, tables, figures, etc. are all in order, the layout features of pages, 
paragraphs, fonts, tables, etc. are the same as in the source text, and the 
grammar, spelling and punctuation of the target text are all correct. As a final 
stage, the revised and amended translation can be edited stylistically, to ensure 
easy readability. 
This process of quality assurance may be aided by simple text analysis 
software tools. They can be used to implement the procedures described above 
in the following steps. 
  
Before translation: 
 Looking for keywords to identify subject domain and topic of the ST 
 Looking for technical terms in the ST 
 Looking for recurring phrases to assess the internal homogeneity of the 
ST 
 Producing a bilingual term list 
 Producing a bilingual phraseology list 
 Pretranslation in Word using the Find and Replace option 
 
After translation: 
 Checking the number of words (tokens) in the ST and TT 
 Checking the number of paragraphs in the ST and TT 
 Reading the TT and comparing it to the ST 
 Spellchecking and grammar checking 
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4. Tools and material 
Only three software tools are used here: Microsoft Word for word processing, 
Microsoft Excel for preparing term and phrase lists, and a free concordance 
program, AntConc 3.2.1, written by Laurence Anthony, used for analysing the 
source text and extracting terms and phrases. AntConc can be downloaded from 
Laurence Anthony’s website: http://www.antlab.sci.waseda.ac.jp/software.html. 
The source text used for illustrating the process in this paper is a European 
Commission press release entitled “EU research and innovation funding: 
Commission consults on radical changes to create more growth and jobs”, which 
was downloaded on 18 April 2011 from the webpage 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/138. 
The official Hungarian version of the text is available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/138&format=HT
ML&aged=0&language=HU&guiLanguage=en. (Both texts are presented in the 
Appendix.) 
5. Keywords 
The Word List function of AntConc can be used to produce a list of all the word 
forms that occur in the source text, along with frequency information on each 
word (number of tokens for each word form in the text). The aim of this is to 
identify keywords in the text. A keyword for our purposes here can be defined 
as an item which occurs with outstanding frequency in the text. Function words 
like “the”, “and”, “to” etc. should of course be ignored. (It is possible to filter 
them out from the search with the help of a predefined stop list, but we can do 
without this option here.) By studying the keywords, translators can familiarise 
themselves with the topic of the source text. The following table presents a 
selection of the results. 
 
Rank Frequency Word 
6 21 innovation 
8 16 research 
9 14 eu 
10 13 funding 
11 11 framework 
15 9 commission 
 
From this table it instantly becomes clear that the text is about innovation and 
research funding in the European Union. 
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6. Concordances 
The next step can be looking at concordance lines of the highest frequency 
keywords in the text. A concordance provides a list of the tokens of the selected 
word form along with the words that occur in its neighbourhood within a range 
specified by the user. The aim of this is to become familiar with how the words 
selected combine with other words. A sample concordance of “innovation” is 
presented below. 
 
This concordance makes it clear in the company of what other words the word 
form “innovation” typically occurs in this particular text. Such word companies 
are called collocations. Concordances can be sorted according to the n-th 
element to the left or right of the keyword, to bring out these patterns of use.  
Below is a sorted version of the concordance above, arranged according to 
the second element to the left. This concordance of the word “innovation” alone 
enables us to find some of the key expressions of the text. But to produce a 
complete list of key terms and phrases, we can use the N-grams function of the 
program, which is part of the Clusters window. 
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7. N-grams 
An n-gram is a sequence of n consecutive running words in the text. The aim of 
looking for n-grams in the source text is twofold. The first is to identify possible 
technical terms, while the second is to find recurring phrases to assess the 
internal homogeneity of the source text. This is done by finding maximal n-
grams in the text. A maximal n-gram can be defined as an XP that does not 
occur as part of another n-gram which itself is an XP. (Thus the phrase 
“European Institute of Innovation” is not a maximal n-gram because it occurs as 
part of “European Institute of Innovation and Technology”. 
In AntConc we can set the minimum and maximum size of n-grams we are 
looking for, and can also define the minimum n-gram frequency for the search. 
Since a technical term can consist of a single word, the minimum size should be 
set to one. A convenient maximum size in this text seems to be 6. If we want to 
make sure we capture all possible technical terms, then the minimum frequency 
should be set to one. This will of course greatly increase the number of n-gram 
tokens found, which means the translator will need more time to browse through 
the list than in the case of a higher minimum frequency number. A fragment of 
the search results is presented below. 
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The result of the search can then be saved into various file formats using the 
Save Output to Text File command. The simplest solution is to save the results 
in a .txt file, in which the n-grams are presented in a list, with rank and 
frequency numbers and n-grams separated by tabs. The next step is to browse 
through this list and weed out the irrelevant items. The result will be a clean list 
containing only technical terms and recurring phrases. 
8. Processing data in Excel 
Terminological and phraseological units can most easily be handled in a 
spreadsheet application such as MS Excel. First we can open a new Excel sheet 
and create a table of three columns with the headers “Frequency”, “English” and 
“Hungarian”. Rank information can be ignored. The data from the text file can 
now be imported and then the “Hungarian” column filled in, with the help of 
various terminological sources such as the EU’s IATE online database 
(iate.europa.eu), as illustrated below. 
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When the table is ready, the data can be used to produce a preliminary 
translation of the text, in which the English expressions that occur in the table 
are replaced by their Hungarian equivalents. 
9. Pretranslation 
The aim of the pretranslation process is to make sure that technical terms are 
translated correctly and that recurring phrases are translated consistently. (If this 
kind of rigid consistency is not desirable in the target text, it can be eliminated 
during the translation or the editing phase.) The first step is to create a copy of 
the source text by saving it under a different file name. We will work into this 
new file in order to keep the source file unchanged. Then the terms and recurring 
phrases of the source text can be substituted by their Hungarian equivalents 
using the Find and Replace function of MS Word, as illustrated below. 
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The result of the pretranslation process will be an essentially English text that 
contains Hungarian terms and phrases. This is the point where the actual 
translation begins. To put it simply, the task now is to remove all signs of the 
fact that the text was originally formulated in English. 
10. Translation 
There are two fundamentally good ways to do the translation using the 
pretranslated text. One way is to move the cursor to the beginning of a paragraph 
and then hit the enter key to open a new paragraph. This way the new paragraph 
will inherit all the basic formal properties of the original one. Now we can write 
the translation in the new paragraph, copying Hungarian pieces of text from the 
original. When the paragraph is finished, the original one can be deleted. 
The other way is to write over the original text using the Correction tool of 
Word. With the help of the Track Changes feature the changes we make in the 
text can be traced, and when we are ready with a sentence (or a paragraph), we 
can accept or modify the changes in the text. 
11. Revising the translation 
When the translation is finished, it will have to be revised from several points of 
view. The primary requirement in most forms of translation is that the target text 
conveys the same information as the source text. Revision should thus 
principally involve a checking of the completeness of the translation and the 
elimination of mistakes of logical meaning. Such mistakes may be 
mistranslations, as a result of misinterpreting certain segments of the source text, 
or ambiguities, as a result of a careless formulation of the target text. It must also 
be checked that the internal and external consistency of the source text comes 
through properly in the translation. In our present project this is ensured by the 
pretranslation of the text. 
Secondly, revision also involves checking that the formal features of the 
first draft follow those of the original. If we follow the translation procedure 
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described above, this requirement will almost certainly be fulfilled. However, 
even in this workflow scenario, we need to carefully check if bold or italicised 
segments appear as they should in the target text. 
Thirdly, revision also involves correcting any mistakes of grammar, 
spelling and punctuation in the target language. 
In revising the target text, we can apply the following procedure. First we 
need to open the source as well as the target text. Then we arrange them side by 
side on the screen, using the Parallel View feature of Word. Next we can check 
the number of words and paragraphs in the two texts, as illustrated by the 
following figure. 
 
 
The point of checking the number of words is this. It has been observed that in 
English-to-Hungarian translation the number of target text words generally 
shows an up to 20% increase compared with the number of source text words. If 
translators are aware of such general tendencies, then the fact that the target text 
is within or over this limit may indicate to them whether the translation is likely 
to convey the same amount of information as the original. But we need to 
remember that this comparison is only of an indicative nature and it does not 
provide decisive information in any case. 
Then we check the number of paragraphs in the two texts. Normally no 
change in this number is expected in specialised translation, unless the target text 
is intended to be a summary of the original.  
Computerised Text Analysis Tools and Translation Quality 31 
It would also be useful to check the number of sentences in the two texts, 
and some concordance programs do make this possible, but AntConc, the 
program we are using here does not offer such an option and nor does MS Word 
in its present version. 
The next step is to carefully compare the target text with the source text 
sentence by sentence. In general, a good method is to read one sentence of the 
target text first and then the corresponding sentence of the source text. This has 
the advantage that we will be able to see the translation from the target reader’s 
point of view, uninfluenced by the original (Mossop 2001: 123). If we do not 
understand the translation right away, without the help of the source text, there is 
definitely a problem with it. 
When the translator has read through the text and corrected all errors of 
content, it will still have to be checked for possible mistakes of spelling, 
grammar and punctuation. This can be done using the Spellchecking and 
Grammar Checking features of Word. However, we need to be cautious with 
these features because for various reasons they will often come up with incorrect 
suggestions. In the end, it is always the responsibility of the human applying the 
computer to a task to make sure that the results are correct. 
12. Conclusion 
The main aim of this paper was to show how computerised text analysis tools 
(concordancers) may be incorporated into the translation process to help the 
translator in identifying key features of the source text before starting the 
translation and also in producing and checking the target text. It is argued here 
that the use of such tools may considerably contribute to improving the quality 
of translations by making translation quality assurance more systematic. And 
since some of these simple programs can be acquired free of charge, the 
translator does not even have to invest money to make the translation quality 
assurance process more effective. Such tools thus are an ideal choice for part-
time translators whose income is so limited that they cannot afford to buy more 
sophisticated CAT tools. Another potentially very useful area of their application 
is in translator training, where they can be used to raise the awareness of 
students of various textual features and also of the importance of quality 
assurance. 
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IP/11/138 
Brussels, February 9, 2011 
EU research and innovation funding: Commission consults on radical 
changes to create more growth and jobs 
The European Commission today launches a consultation on major 
improvements to EU research and innovation funding to make participation 
easier, increase scientific and economic impact and improve value for money. 
The proposed “Common Strategic Framework”, set out in a Green Paper, 
would cover the current Framework Programme for Research (FP7), the 
Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) and the 
European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT). This will create a 
coherent set of instruments, along the whole “innovation chain” starting from 
basic research, culminating in bringing innovative products and services to 
market, and also supporting non-technological innovation, for example in design 
and marketing. The Commission's Green Paper also provides the basis for far-
reaching simplification of procedures and rules. The changes aim to maximise 
the contribution of EU research and innovation funding to the Innovation Union 
and the Europe 2020 Strategy. Stakeholders have until 20 May 2011 to respond.  
European Commissioner for Research and Innovation Máire Geoghegan-
Quinn said: “Our aim is to maximise value from every euro the EU invests in 
research and innovation. We want EU funding to realise its enormous potential 
to generate growth and jobs and improve quality of life in Europe in the face of 
daunting challenges like climate change, energy efficiency and food security. By 
making our programmes more coherent and simpler, we will make life easier for 
researchers and innovators – especially SMEs – attract more applicants and get 
even better results. I look forward to an extensive and innovative debate, making 
use of the web and social media.” 
Commissioner Geoghegan-Quinn is issuing the Green Paper in cooperation 
with the six other Commissioners with responsibility for research and 
innovation, Vice- Presidents Kallas, Kroes and Tajani, and Commissioners 
Vassiliou, Potočnik and Oettinger.  
Simpler access to EU research and innovation funding  
In its Green Paper, the Commission proposes a “Common Strategic 
Framework”, combining three key aspects.  
First, a clear focus on three mutually reinforcing objectives: giving the EU a 
world-beating science base; boosting competitiveness across the board; and 
tackling grand challenges such as climate change, resource efficiency, energy 
and food security, health and an ageing population.  
Second, making EU funding more attractive and easier to access for 
participants, for example through a single entry point with common IT tools or a 
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one-stop shop for providing advice and support to participants throughout the 
funding process. Furthermore, the Common Strategic Framework will allow a 
simpler and more streamlined set of funding instruments covering the full 
innovation chain, including basic research, applied research, collaboration 
between academia and industry and firm-level innovation. Flexibility will be 
promoted to encourage diversity and business involvement. Applicants should 
be able to apply for several different projects without repeatedly providing the 
same information.  
Third, there will be much simpler and more consistent procedures for 
accounting for the use of the funds received. This may involve, for example, 
greater use of lump sum payments. 
Greater simplicity will make financial control of EU taxpayers1 money 
easier and more effective. 
Other ideas in the Green Paper include: further steps to pool Member 
States’ national research funding; better links with cohesion funding; using EU 
funding to stimulate public procurement; more use of prizes; further 
strengthening the role of the European Research Council and of financial 
instruments such as the Risk-Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF) and the loan 
guarantee and venture capital investments; and drawing up a set of performance 
indicators to measure the success of EU research and innovation funding.  
The Commission will launch in the coming weeks a competition to find the 
most inspiring name for the new common framework.  
The Commission’s proposals take fully into account the interim evaluations 
of the current 7
th
 Framework programme (see IP/10/1525) and the 
Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme. The Commission’s 
response to the FP7 evaluation is also published today (available via link below). 
Next steps 
The consultation is open for comments from today. The deadline for 
contributions is 20 May. On 10 June, the Commission will organise a major 
closing conference as a follow-up to the public consultation. The name for the 
new Strategic Framework will be announced there.  
The Commission will then bring forward before the end of 2011 a 
legislative proposal for research and innovation spending under the future EU 
budget post-2013.  
Background 
The current Framework Programme for Research FP7 has a budget of EUR 
53 billion (2007–2013). More than 9,000 projects have so far been funded. A 
study has estimated that projects selected for funding in 2011 alone will create 
up to 165 000 jobs (see IP/10/966) 
The Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme has a budget 
of EUR 3.6 billion (2007–2013) and has supported more than 100,000 SMEs 
through loan guarantees alone as well as innovative ICT pilot projects.  
The European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) is an 
autonomous EU body stimulating world-leading innovation, through the 
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pioneering concept of Knowledge and Innovation Communities. The EIT 
received EUR 309 million from the EU Budget for the period 2007-2013.  
Links 
Consultation on the Green Paper 
Innovation Union web page 
European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) 
Seventh Framework Programme 
Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme 
European Research Council 
Risk-Sharing Finance Facility 
(RSFF evaluation) 
Report of the FP7 interim evaluation expert group 
Commission response on the interim evaluation report 
April 2010 European Commission Communication on simplification 
 
IP/11/138 
Brüsszel, 2011. február 9 
Uniós kutatás- és innovációfinanszírozás: A Bizottság gyökeres változta-
tásokról egyeztet a gazdasági növekedés és a munkahelyteremtés érdekében 
Az Európai Bizottság ma nyilvános konzultációt kezdeményez az Európai 
Unió kutatás- és innovációfinanszírozási rendszerének jelentős továbbfejlesztése 
érdekében, amivel azt kívánja elérni, hogy könnyebbé váljék az érintett progra-
mokban való részvétel, nagyobb legyen az elvégzett munka tudományos és gaz-
dasági hatása, és ugyanannyi ráfordítás több eredményt hozzon. Az ennek kap-
csán közzétett zöld könyvben javasolt „közös stratégiai keret” a jelenleg folya-
matban lévő hetedik kutatási keretprogramra, a versenyképességi és innovációs 
keretprogramra, valamint az Európai Innovációs és Technológiai Intézetre ter-
jedne ki. Ezáltal az eszközrendszer egységes egésszé állna össze, és az alapkuta-
tástól az innovatív termékek és szolgáltatások piaci hasznosításáig az „innová-
ciós lánc” valamennyi elemére kiterjedne, miközben támogatná a nem technoló-
giai jellegű, például a formatervezés vagy a marketing területén végrehajtott 
innovációt is. A Bizottság zöld könyvében foglaltak ezenkívül az eljárások és a 
szabályok radikális leegyszerűsítésére is lehetőségét adnak. A változtatásoktól a 
Bizottság azt reméli, hogy az Európai Unió kutatás- és innovációfinanszírozó 
programjai a jövőben erőteljesebben tudják majd támogatni az innovatív Unióra 
vonatkozó kezdeményezésben és az Európa 2020 stratégiában kitűzött célok 
teljesítését. A Bizottság 2011. május 20-ig várja az érdekeltek észrevételeit.  
Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, a Bizottság kutatásügyért és innovációért felelős 
tagja a következőket mondta: „Azt szeretnénk elérni, hogy az Európai Unió által 
kutatásra és innovációra költött minden egyes euró a lehető legnagyobb hasznot 
hajtsa. Azt akarjuk, hogy az uniós finanszírozás beváltsa a hozzá fűzött óriási 
reményeket a gazdasági növekedést és a foglalkoztatási szint emelkedését illető-
en, és olyan súlyos kihívások közepette is hozzájáruljon az európai polgárok 
életminőségének javításához, mint amit az éghajlatváltozással, az energiahaté-
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konysággal vagy az élelmiszer-ellátás biztonságával kapcsolatos kérdések ma 
jelentenek számunkra. Programjaink következetesebbé és egyszerűbbé tételével 
megkönnyítjük a kutatók és az innovációra kész vállalkozások – különösen a 
kis- és középvállalkozások – életét, több pályázót vonzunk magunkhoz, és még 
jobb eredményeket remélhetünk. Élénk, innovatív vitára számítok, melynek 
színteréül az internet és a közösségi médiumok szolgálnak majd.” 
A zöld könyvet Máire Geoghegan-Quinn hat biztostársával: Siim Kallas, 
Neelie Kroes és Antonio Tajani alelnökökkel és Andrula Vasziliu, Janez 
Potočnik és Günther Oettinger bizottsági tagokkal közösen bocsátja ki.  
Egyszerűbb hozzáférés az uniós kutatás- és innovációfinanszírozáshoz  
A zöld könyvben a Bizottság egy úgynevezett közös stratégiai keretre tesz 
javaslatot, amely három hangsúlyos elemből áll.  
Egyrészt egyértelműen három, egymást kölcsönösen támogató célkitűzésre 
összpontosít: arra, hogy az EU tudományos bázisa világelső legyen; a verseny-
képesség fellendítésére minden területen; valamint azoknak a legnagyobb kihí-
vásoknak a megválaszolására, amelyek például az éghajlatváltozás, az erőforrás-
hatékonyság, az energia- és az élelmiszer-ellátás biztonsága, az egészségügy és a 
népesség elöregedése területén előttünk állnak.  
Másrészt vonzóbbá és könnyebben hozzáférhetővé kívánja tenni a résztve-
vők számára az uniós finanszírozást: egységes informatikai eszköztár alkalmazá-
sával működő egyetlenegy belépési pont kialakítását és olyan „egyablakos ügy-
intézés” bevezetését javasolja, amelyen keresztül a résztvevők a finanszírozási 
folyamat valamennyi szakaszában értékes tanácsokhoz és támogatáshoz juthat-
nak. A közös stratégiai keret emellett lehetővé teszi a finanszírozási eszközök 
leegyszerűsítését és ésszerűsítését is a teljes „innovációs lánc” mentén, függetlenül 
attól, hogy alapkutatás, alkalmazott kutatás, egyetemek és ipari vállalkozások 
közötti együttműködés vagy vállalati szintű innováció támogatásáról van-e szó. A 
sokféleség és a vállalkozói szektor részvételének biztosítása érdekében rugalma-
sabbá válnak a finanszírozási rendszerek. A pályázóknak arra is lehetőségük lesz, 
hogy adataik egyszeri megadásával több elképzelésükkel is pályázzanak.  
Harmadrészt jelentősen egyszerűbbé és következetesebbé válik a megkapott 
pénzekkel való elszámolás, és nagyobb tér nyílhat például az átalányösszeges 
kifizetések előtt. 
Az egyszerűbb szabályok könnyebbé és hatékonyabbá teszik az adóbefize-
tések felhasználásával kapcsolatos ellenőrzéseket is. 
A zöld könyv más elképzeléseket is tartalmaz: további lépéseket irányoz elő 
a tagállamok nemzeti szintű kutatási előirányzatainak együttes felhasználása 
érdekében; javítaná a kohéziós célú kifizetésekkel fennálló kapcsolatokat; java-
solja, hogy az uniós források a közbeszerzést is ösztönözzék; felveti a pénzdíjak 
létrehozásának lehetőségét; tovább erősítené az Európai Kutatási Tanács és 
olyan pénzügyi eszközök, mint a kockázatmegosztási pénzügyi mechanizmus, a 
hitelgaranciák és a kockázati tőkebefektetések szerepét; és olyan teljesítmény-
mutatók kidolgozását javasolja, amelyekkel mérhető az uniós kutatás- és inno-
vációfinanszírozás sikere.  
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A Bizottság szeretne gondolatébresztő elnevezést találni a közös stratégiai 
keret számára, ezért erről a következő hetekben ötletpályázatot fog hirdetni.  
A Bizottság javaslatai teljes mértékben figyelembe veszik a folyamatban 
lévő hetedik keretprogrammal és a versenyképességi és innovációs keretprog-
rammal kapcsolatban elvégzett értékelések eredményeit (lásd IP/10/1525). A 
Bizottság ma hozta nyilvánosságra azt a közleményét is, amelyben a hetedik 
keretprogram időközi értékelésére adott válaszát fogalmazza meg (lásd lejjebb, a 
hivatkozások között). 
A következő lépések 
A konzultáció keretében a mai naptól lehet észrevételeket tenni. Az észre-
vételek benyújtásának határideje május 20. A konzultációs folyamatot egy június 
10-én megrendezendő nagyszabású konferencia zárja, melyen a Bizottság beje-
lenti a közös stratégiai keret új elnevezését is.  
A Bizottság ezután 2011 végéig beterjeszti az uniós költségvetés következő, 
2013 utáni ciklusában végrehajtandó kutatás- és innovációfinanszírozó progra-
mokra vonatkozó jogalkotási javaslatait.  
Háttér 
A jelenleg folyamatban lévő, 2007-től 2013-ig tartó hetedik kutatási keret-
program 53 milliárd euróból gazdálkodik. Eddig több mint 9000 projekt része-
sült finanszírozásban. Egy felmérés becslése szerint csak a 2011-ben finanszíro-
zásra kiválasztott projektek mintegy 165 000 új munkahelyet fognak teremteni 
(lásd IP/10/966). 
A versenyképességi és innovációs keretprogram – ugyancsak 2007-től 
2013-ig – összesen 3,6 milliárd euró felett rendelkezik, és eddig csak hitelgaran-
cia formájában több mint 100 000 kis- és középvállalkozásnak, valamint innova-
tív kísérleti IKT-projekteknek nyújtott támogatást.  
Az Európai Innovációs és Technológiai Intézet (EIT) egy autonóm EU-
szerv, mely az úttörő jellegű eszköznek számító úgynevezett tudományos és 
innovációs társulásokon keresztül a világszínvonalon is meghatározó innováció 
elősegítésére törekszik. Az EIT a 2007-től 2013-ig tartó költségvetési ciklusban 
309 millió eurót kapott az Unió költségvetéséből.  
Hivatkozások 
Konzultáció a zöld könyvben foglaltakról 
Az „innovatív Unió” honlapja 
Az Európai Innovációs és Technológiai Intézet (EIT) 
A hetedik keretprogram 
A versenyképességi és innovációs keretprogram 
Az Európai Kutatási Tanács 
A kockázatmegosztási pénzügyi mechanizmus 
(a mechanizmus értékelése) 
A szakértői csoport jelentése a hetedik keretprogram időközi értékeléséről 
A Bizottság válasza az időközi értékelésről összeállított jelentésre 
Az Európai Bizottság 2010. áprilisi közleménye az egyszerűsítésről 
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The Semantic Analysis of OE munan 
Agnieszka Wawrzyniak 
1. Introduction 
According to Anglo-Saxon Dictionary (BT, sv. munan), OE munan is related to 
Goth. ga-munan, O Sax. far-munan, and Icel. muna. As Anglo-Saxon Dictionary 
(sv. munan) illustrates, the following senses can be distinguished in OE munan: 
1) to remember, be mindful of, be careful of 
2) to consider, think. 
Before engaging in close analysis, it should be pointed out that no empirical 
investigations concerning the semantics of munan have been carried out. Hence, 
this verb, similar to other preterite-present verbs that did not survive, has not had 
due attention paid to it. With the exception of witan, which has been subject to 
investigation (Koivisto-Alanko 2000, Radden 2003), other lost preterite-present 
verbs have been neglected.  
We should also emphasise that the concept of gemunan, whose semantics is 
interpreted in terms of remember (Campbell 1959: 345) was conceived of 
differently than its Present-Day English equivalent. The aim of this study will 
thus be to show differences in the conceptualisation between Old English munan 
and the Present-Day English corresponding sense – ‘remember’. However, the 
present analysis will not focus on the semantics of remember, but rather on the 
semantic path of munan. Therefore, the semantics of Present-Day English to 
remember will serve only as a background to illustrate better differences in the 
conceptualisation of the seemingly corresponding Old English equivalent. 
Moreover, the analysis will aim to distinguish between senses that could be 
referred to as root, hence, logically objective and epistemic ones, thereby 
subjective and individual. Furthermore, the study will illustrate a mechanism 
that could account for the development of epistemic senses, as well as the time 
when such senses were first recorded.  
In the analysis of munan, three stages within the Old English period will be 
distinguished: 10th c., 10th/11th c. (the transition stage), and 11th c. The present 
analysis is based on the Toronto Corpus compiled by Antonette di Paolo Healey 
(1986) and presents a quantitative approach based on detailed statistics within 
the concept of munan. In order to achieve maximum accuracy, munan was 
analysed in all attested contexts from the Toronto Corpus. Nevertheless, one 
should take into account the fact that however detailed and accurate the corpus 
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is, it may not always reflect the semantic reality of the distant past. The data can 
thus be distorted as not all the texts that were written down in the Old English 
period are preserved in corpora. Consequently the semantic analysis may be 
more of a corpus artefact rather than a reflection of the actual semantics of 
munan in the Anglo-Saxon period. Nevertheless, corpora are valid sources of 
information. Therefore, one can hope that its contents reflect, to a certain extent, 
the semantic reality of munan. Still, the data should not be taken with statistical 
accuracy as they seem to be fragmentary. Moreover, some senses are scarcely 
documented as often happens with data from the distant past. Rather, the 
available figures should be treated as drawing the plausible path of change from 
the objective to a subjective sense by indicating which senses were most 
numerous in the three analysed stages. 
It should also be emphasised that a path of a semantic change that can be 
seen in munan reflects a general tendency that accompanies other mental verbs. 
Such tendencies or paths of semantic changes have been vastly described 
(Traugott 1989, Sweetser 1990, Radden 2003). According to Traugott (1989), 
the directionality of semantic change reflects a path from the initial, root 
meaning, thus from the real-world domain, to the epistemic, abstract, logical 
one, which focuses on the internal world of a speaker’s belief and knowledge 
status. Similarly, Sweetser (1990) claims that the internal self is understood in 
terms of bodily external self and hence described by the vocabulary connected 
with the external self. She highlights that these correspondences are not isolated 
but they are a part of a larger system, which involves our conceptualisation of 
one area of experience in terms of another. In other words, physical functions 
and states are metaphorically associated with mental functions and states. 
Sweetser sees the shift of meanings from the concrete to the abstract as a change 
from the socio-physical level to the abstract, logical, epistemic level. For her, it 
is the speaker’s reasoning process that is a subject to metaphor. The path of a 
change from the concrete to the abstract has also been discussed by Radden 
(2003). In his study of verbs denoting perception, Radden analyses the shift from 
PIE weid (to see) to OE witan (to know). He claims that this process should be 
referred to as metaphor based on metonymy. The sequential ordering of the two 
events I know it because I saw it hence the Effect sanding for the Cause 
constitutes metaphorical basis for the metaphor in which the two domains of 
perception and cognition are mapped. A similar mechanism of the metaphor 
based on metonymy can also be observed in munan. 
The paper will thus confirm the widely held assumption that meanings tend 
to move toward greater subjectivity, thereby reflecting the shift from a relatively 
objective control of some entity to a more subjective one. 
Moreover, the purpose of the paper is also to show which morphological 
forms might have developed epistemic senses prior to other forms. This kind of 
distinction has been implemented by Aijmer (1985). She maintains that such 
changes come about by the gradual application of the form to more and more 
contexts. Such was the case, according to Aijmer (1985: 13), with the 
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development of the volitional will into a future being initiated in the 3rd person 
singular. The aim of the final part of my analysis is to juxtapose munan with 
āgan not to show the similarity in their semantic profiles but to indicate that in 
both verbs new senses developed in particular contexts in particular 
morphological forms and they spread to other forms only later. 
2. Semantic analysis of munan  
Before moving to an analysis of Old English munan, the aim of this section will 
be to compare it to its Present-Day English apparent equivalent: remember. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989), (sv. remember) remember is 
given the following senses: 
1) to retain in, or recall to the memory; to bear in mind, recollect 
2) to think of, recall the memory of 
3) to record, mention 
4) to have or bear in mind 
5) to have mind, memory or recollection of something 
Thus, the essential attributes in remember are related either to storing 
events/entities in one’s memory or recollecting them. The semantic content 
imprinted in remember presupposes the individual keeping in mind events 
related either to his/her life or the life of others he/she has been directly or 
indirectly involved with. There are three main attributes that can be 
distinguished in the verb remember. Firstly, it is related to the individual and 
his/her mode of storing events. Secondly, it is subjective, as it presupposes how 
an individual keeps events in his/her mind. In other words, the semantics of 
remember implies that the event restored in memory and then retold is 
fragmentary and subjective rather than reflecting an actual reality. Moreover, 
there are frequently as many versions of past events as many people who can 
remember them. Finally, remember is a mental verb, as it is related to the 
process of either storing events in one’s memory or recollecting them. 
In examining the Old English sense of munan, one notices that its semantics 
implied different attributes when compared with the Present-Day English 
remember. To begin with, the original idea behind Old English munan was not 
to remember in the sense to recollect or simply to keep in one’s memory. The 
available data from the Toronto Corpus indicate that this sense developed only 
in the 11th c. and was indicative of a high degree of subjectivity. The original 
sense of munan was to be aware of, to be conscious of and implied that one 
should implement in one’s life what one should be conscious of. In other words, 
the semantics of munan was not mental but rather normative and social. It was 
directed toward principles, Christian norms rather than events related to the 
individual. Hence, the meaning of munan initially was objective and excluded 
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personal, subjective undertones. This sense of munan seems to be the only one in 
the 10th c. 
Changes in the semantics of munan can be observed in further stages, as 
well. In the 10th/11th c. (II stage), subjective undertones start to emerge, yet the 
objective sense prevails. In the 11th c. (III stage), the subjective senses of munan 
seem numerous, and the verb can also perform a speech-act function. 
Nevertheless, objective senses are also present. Thus, in the 11th c., munan can 
express both an objective, root sense, and a subjective epistemic one. 
In the present study, the following senses of munan will be taken into 
account: 
1) to be aware of, to be conscious of, to realise (objective sense) 
2) the sense ‘to remember’ behind munan becomes related to one’s personal 
life; (the sense of ‘being conscious of’ is still present but at this point 
becomes directed to an individual’s life) 
3) the pure sense – ‘to remember’ (to keep in mind or recollect from memory) 
4) the sense ‘to remember’ as a speech-act verb 
Hence, the analysis of all morphological forms of munan will show the gradual 
semantic development from sense 1 (logical, objective) through the intermediate 
stage (sense 2) to the subjective, epistemic stage (senses 3, 4). Sense 1 is 
normative, collective and will be referred to as a root one. Sense 2 occupies the 
intermediate stage on the development to epistemicity as it focuses on individual 
events but with the old meaning – to be aware of – prevailing. Hence, at this 
stage, the meaning of munan is only partly subjective. Senses 3 and 4 are 
epistemic. The meaning of munan at stage 3 is ‘to remember’, ‘to recollect’, 
while the former sense ‘to be conscious of’ is no longer present. Thus, the 
activity behind munan is typically mental. The verb focuses on the internal 
world of the speaker’s belief and knowledge status, and is not underpinned by 
moral undertones but by the subjective capacity to recollect events as viewed by 
the speaker. Sense 4 marks munan as a speech-act verb in discourse situations, 
where it functions as a discourse marker, and its application is automatic. Its role 
is only introductory and used to invite a hearer to a discourse. The speaker, 
hence, does not intend to emphasise what he/she remembers but to state what 
happened at a particular time. Munan had already developed this function in Old 
English. At that point, munan is devoid of the sense ‘to remember’, ‘to 
recollect’, but rather permits an extension of meaning to involve the speaker’s 
attitude to the message. It is no longer a lexical item but a purely pragmaticalised 
expression. 
The following subsections will analyse the morphological forms of munan 
separately to show the path of semantic development of particular forms and to 
draw the differences in the conceptualisation of present and past forms of 
munan. 
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3. Semantic analysis of the infinitive of munan 
An analysis of the infinitive munan based on the Toronto Corpus records the 
following senses: 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
to have in mind (objective sense) 
to have in mind (partly subjective sense) 
to remember, recollect 
speech act verb 
5 cases, 100% 
– 
– 
– 
9 cases, 82% 
2 cases, 18% 
– 
– 
14 cases, 45% 
12 cases, 39% 
5 cases, 10% 
– 
The analysis of the infinitive munan leads us to the following conclusions. 
Munan in the 10th c. was scarcely documented. The Toronto Corpus records 
only five cases of munan, and their meaning is objective, hence ‘to be aware of’, 
‘be conscious of’. The concept of objectivity underlying munan in the 10th c. 
can be illustrated by the following sentences: 
 
(1) Forþon we sculon a hycgende hælo rædes gemunan tone selestan sigora 
waldend. 
 ‘Mindful of saving salvation from an ordinance, must we keep in mind 
the disposer of victories.’ 
(Vainglory: Krapp and Dobbie 1936, 147-9) 
 
(2) Hwæs weneþ se þe mid gewitte nyle gemunan þa mildan meotodes lare. 
 ‘What expects the one who in his wisdom will not keep the teaching of 
Christ.’ 
(Christ: Krapp and Dobbie 1936, 3-49) 
Hence, munan in both sentences implies the idea of ‘keeping in mind’, being 
aware of, rather than the pure sense of remembering. Moreover, in sentence (2) 
munan is juxtaposed with the phrase mid gewitte. This phrase, munan mid 
gewitte, indicates that munan is applied here to the act of ‘being aware of’ rather 
than of ‘remembering’; otherwise, the above context would be tautological. The 
analysis records only one phrase with apparently tautological expression, other 
contexts with munan from the 10th c. record the concept of ‘keeping in mind’ as 
illustrated in sentence (1). These contexts use munan in the following phrases: 
– gemunan soþ and riht ‘to keep in mind what is true and right’ 
(Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58) 
– gemunan meotodes streng þo ‘to keep in mind God’s strength’  
(Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58) 
– gemunan gastes bled ‘to keep in mind the blood of Holy Spirit’  
(Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58) 
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3.1 Semantic analysis of munan in the 10th/11th c. 
The data, though fragmentary, gives a hint as to which senses were the most 
numerous and which were scarcely documented. The most highly documented 
sense seems still the objective one (have in mind/be aware of) – 9 cases, (82%). 
Yet, at that time, there appears a tendency to use the concept keep in mind 
personal events. Hence, another sense emerges, which is partly subjective and 
which constitutes an intermediate stage to the epistemic sense. The objective 
sense of munan in the 10th/11th c. can be shown in the following examples: 
 
(3) And ute gemunan þæt we sculon ealle deade beon. 
 ‘Let keep in mind/be aware that we all shall be dead.’ 
(Third Sunday after Epiphany: Willard 1935, 38-56) 
(4) Đonne sceolon we nu gemunan þone eges fullan domes dæg se cumeþ nu 
ungeara. 
 ‘We should keep in mind that the Judgement Day comes soon.’  
(Morris 1874-80, Blicking Homily no. 8: Morris 1874-80, 97-105) 
The partly subjective senses from the 10th/11th c. can be exemplified by the 
following contexts: 
 
(5) Đa reaferas geþencaþ swi þe oft hu micel hie sellaþ and swi þe seldon 
hie willaþ gemunan hu micel hie nimaþ. 
 ‘Thieves think very often how much they give and very rarely they are 
willing to be aware how much they take.’ 
(Gregory the Great, Pastoral Care: Sweet 1871, 24-467) 
 
(6) Gif he wile gemunan þa þe he o þrum monnum deþ. 
 ‘If he were willing to realise what he does to other people.’ 
(Gregory the Great, Pastoral Care: Sweet 1871, 24-467) 
The meaning of gemunan is still underpinned by the sense ‘to stick to’, ‘have in 
mind’ with normative connotations, yet an increase in subjectivity can be 
noticed, as the event in focus is personal and subjective, rather than universal.  
3.2 Semantic analysis of munan in the 11th c. 
Though the objective sense is still numerous, it is less common in comparison 
with previous stages. Moreover, the percentage of partly subjective senses seems 
higher than in previous stages (39%). Furthermore, in the 11th c. one can 
observe the emergence of a new sense – ‘to remember’, ‘recollect’, thus, an 
epistemic one, constituting 5 cases (16%) in the infinitive munan. 
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(7) Bide þinne drihten eadmodlice forgifnesse ealra þara synna þe þu wiþ 
Godes willan geworht hæbbe þara þe þu gemunan mæge and þara þe þu 
gemunan ne mæge. 
 ‘Ask God for forgiveness for all the sins that you did against God’s will 
that you can and cannot remember.’ 
 (Leofa man þe is mycel þearf þu þas drihtenlican tide georne geþence: 
Dictionary of Old English transcript, edited from Oxford, Bodleian 
Library, MS. Junius 121) 
 
(8)  Nu gyt syndon manige men lifigende þu þa þis gemunan magon. 
 ‘There are many people still alive who can remember this.’ 
(Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Book 1: Hecht 1900-7, 11, 14-90). 
 
(9)  And on þis ylcan geare com se stranga winter mid forste and mid snawe 
þæt nan man þa on like þæt mihte gemunan swa strange winter. 
 ‘That same year came a strong winter with snow and frost and there is 
hardly any man that can remember such a strong winter.’ 
(London, British Library, MS. Cotton Tiberius B. 1: Rositzke 1940) 
One can see in these sentences that they have developed the sense of 
recollecting/remembering. Yet, even though these sentences are based on the 
concept of remembering/recollecting, it seems that sentence (7) could be also 
viewed as belonging to the intermediate stage, where the sense ‘to be aware of’ 
could equally fit. Hence, sentence (7) could be interpreted in two different ways: 
 
 i. Ask God for forgiveness for sins that you can and you cannot 
remember, or 
 ii. Ask God for forgiveness for all sins that you are, and you are not 
aware of. 
 
The mechanism that is involved in the development of the sense ‘to remember’ 
seems to be the conventionalisation of conversational implicature. Hence, if a 
person is not aware of having committed a sin, he/she does not have this sin on 
his/her mind, thus he/she does not remember it. In other words, the consequence 
of not being aware of committing a sin is not to have this sin on one’s mind, 
which leads to the development of a new sense: 
 
 Ic gemunan ne mæge – I am not aware > I do not remember. 
 
Although the positive senses ‘be aware of’ and ‘remember/recollect’ look 
distinct, with the former inviting the implications ‘to dwell on’, ‘to think of’, 
hence a broad insight, while the sense ‘to remember/recollect’ implies a process 
of focusing on something rather than dwelling on it, hence a narrower insight. In 
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the negative form these senses look much more similar. Thus, conceptually in a 
positive context, the following differences can be distinguished: 
 
– to remember/recollect — focus on only one point, one specific instance, 
not deep process 
– to be aware of — focus on many points, serial perspectives, deep 
process. 
Yet, in negative form, these concepts look more similar: 
– I am not aware of having committed a sin. 
– I do not remember having committed a sin. 
Both look like short, momentary processes. The speaker relies only on his/her 
memory and makes the following inferences. Thus, the new sense ‘to remember’ 
developed from a negative context via the mechanism of conventionalisation of 
conversational implicature. On the other hand, one can also claim that the sense 
‘not be aware of’ and ‘not remember’ are similar, but only to a certain point. 
Namely, the sense ‘not be aware of’ can be viewed conceptually as a path, while 
the sense ‘not remember’ can be seen as a point. The sense ‘not be aware of’ at 
the end of the path looks similar to ‘not remember’. The example below 
illustrates this assumption: 
– I am not aware of committing this sin (this implies I have been focusing 
on this problem thoroughly from many dimensions and cannot retain a 
trace of it in my memory). 
– I do not remember having committed this sin (this implies I just cannot 
retain it in my memory). 
Thus, ‘not be aware of’ implies a path where the subject starts the process, is in 
the middle of it, and ends it. The sense ‘not remember’ implies a point, as the 
subject instantly announces what he/she has on his/her mind.  
However, it seems that a path and a point can only be analysed separately 
when the senses ‘not be aware of’ and ‘not remember’ are developed well 
enough and can be kept as distinct ones. Nevertheless, during the process of a 
new sense emerging – ‘remember’ – there have been degrees of overlapping 
when sentences could be interpreted as either ‘not be aware of’ or ‘not 
remember’. Thus, conceptually one can say that a point became part of a path, or 
that a path made a space for a point. From this perspective, the idea of 
‘remembering’ is the final stage, the consequence of ‘being aware of’. Hence, 
the cause is ‘I am not aware of it’ and the consequence is ‘I cannot remember it’.  
In these contexts, munan can be semantically analysed as a complete, last 
stage activity, which ends the initial, or opening stage of ‘be aware of’. 
Consequently, the development of the sense ‘to remember’ in munan can be 
attributed to the mechanism of conversational implicature based on a metonymic 
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relationship that includes sequential events, and which becomes the source of the 
emerging metaphor (Radden 2003: 98). These two events are temporally linked 
and can be described as PRECEDENCE PLUS CAUSE and SUBSEQUENCE 
PLUS RESULT, and may be interpreted as CAUSAL PRECEDENCE. 
 
At this point Traugott’s (1989) Tendency I can be tested:  
 
Meaning based in the external described situation > meaning based in the 
internal situation. 
When viewed from a certain perspective, the semantic change in munan seems 
metaphorical, yet the particular steps that lead to the final stage are metonymic. 
In other words, even though what takes place is an extension from the concrete 
field (objective sense) to the subjective one (mental recollection), the shift that 
triggers this extension is metonymic. Consequently, the above mechanism 
should be interpreted as a process of an emerging metaphor (Radden 2003: 98). 
4. Semantic analysis of geman 
In analysing geman, a distinction needs to be drawn between the first and third 
person singular, as the semantic path in both forms proceeds differently. 
geman (first person singular present) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
to have in mind (objective sense) 
to have in mind (partly subjective sense)  
to remember  
speech-act verb  
1   100% 
– 
– 
– 
– 
1   100% 
– 
– 
1   11% 
– 
6   67% 
2   22% 
geman (third person singular present) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
to have in mind (objective sense)  
to have in mind (partly subjective sense)  
to remember  
speech-act verb  
– 
– 
– 
– 
3   100% 
– 
– 
– 
4   80% 
1   20% 
– 
– 
The analysis of geman leads to the following conclusions. Geman in the 10th c. 
seems to be scarcely documented. The Toronto Corpus records only one instance 
of geman in the first person singular and no instances in the third person 
singular. Moreover, its meaning was objective, hence ‘to have in mind’ in the 
sense of ‘to be aware of’ or ‘to be conscious of’. 
 
(10) Ne eom ic ana þæt on mode geman hu se maga fremde, godbearn on 
grundum. 
 ‘I am not the only one who is aware in soul how Christ acted, divine 
child on Earth.’ 
(Andreas: Krapp 1932a, 3-51) 
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According to the available data, in the 10th/11th c., geman in the first person 
singular is recorded once but in the partly subjective sense, while in the third 
person singular the root objective form is still preserved. Thus, at this point, a 
gradual distinction in the development of the semantic path can be observed 
between the first and third person singular. The first person singular initiated the 
emergence of new subjective senses through the process of conventionalisation 
of conversational implicature, which later spread to other forms. 
In the 11th c. one can see further consequences of this divergence. 
According to the available data, geman in the third person singular is recorded 
four times in the objective sense (80%) and only once in a partly subjective one 
(20%). Geman however, in the first person singular is documented mostly in 
epistemic senses. The sense ‘to remember’ constitutes 67% and the speech act 
function 22%. The objective sense is recorded only once: 
– to have in mind (objective sense) 
(11) Ic þine soþæstne geman, drihten. 
      ‘I truly keep you mind, God.’ 
(The Paris Psalter: Krapp 1932b, 3-150) 
– to remember 
(12) Ic geman þæt þu swa sædest. 
     ‘I remember that you said so.’ 
(Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy: Sedgefield 1899, 7-149) 
 
(13) Ic geman þæt gedon wæs nu for þrym gærum in minum mynstre. 
 ‘I remember what was done in my monastery three years ago.’ 
(Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Preface and Book 4:  
Hecht 1900-7, 260-350) 
– speech act function 
(14) Đonne ic geman mines ærran lifes, þe ic on mynstre ær wunode, þonne 
asworette ic and 
 ageomrige gelice þam, þe on lefan scipe neah lande gelæfaþ, and se 
storm uþ adrifaþ swa feor 
 þæt hy æt necstan ne magon land geseon. 
 ‘I remember well my earlier life when I lived in a monastery. I 
experience real grief like they who travel on infirm ship near the land 
and the storm comes so far that those who are the nearest cannot see 
land.’ 
(Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Preface and Book 4: Hecht 1900-7, 1-9) 
In sentence (14), one can see that geman performs the role of a speech-act verb. 
Geman in this context is purely introductory and encourages the hearer to a 
discourse. Its function is hence pragmatic. At this point, geman marks Traugott’s 
(1989) Tendency II: 
The Semantic Analysis of OE Munan 47 
Meaning based in the external or internal situation > meaning based in the 
textual situation. 
 
Thus, by developing into a discourse marker, geman represents a change from a 
mental state to a speech-act verb meaning. 
Another mechanism that can be observed during the semantic development 
of geman is divergence (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 113). According to Hopper 
and Traugott (1993: 113), when a lexical from undergoes pragmaticalisation, the 
original lexical form may remain as an autonomous lexical item. Apart from 
being a fixed item with a different set of attributes in analysed pragmatic 
expressions, geman behaves like an autonomous lexical item when found in 
other contexts. 
5. Semantic analysis of gemanst  
The Toronto Corpus records only two instances of gemanst, which are dated to 
the 11th c. They denote the sense ‘remember’ and speech-act function 
respectively: 
– to remember: 
(15) Gemanst tu hwæt wiþ ær spræcon? 
 ‘Do you remember what we were talking about before?’ 
 (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy: Sedgefield 1899, 7-149) 
 
– speech act function: 
(16) Đar þu gemanst broþer þin hæf þ ænig þincg ongean þe, forlaþ þær lac 
þine and ga  
 gesibsumian broþer þinum. 
 ‘If you remember/think your brother has something against you, abstain 
from your fight and reconcile with your brother. 
(Defensor, Liber scintillarum: Getty 1969) 
Thus, the second person singular seems to have emerged in the 11th c., yet 
reflected the newly developed senses. 
6. Semantic analysis of gemunon 
In the analysis of gemunon, a distinction should be drawn between the first, 
second and third person plural. The study will show that the semantic path the 
first and third person plural gemunon underwent reflected the path underlying 
the first and third person singular geman. 
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gemunon (first person plural present) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
keep in mind (objective sense)  
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)  
to remember  
speech-act function  
3   100% 
– 
– 
– 
1   50% 
1   50% 
– 
– 
– 
2   67% 
1   33% 
– 
 
gemunon (second person plural present) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
keep in mind (objective sense)  
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)  
to remember  
speech-act function  
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
1   50% 
1   50% 
– 
– 
 
gemunon (third person plural present) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
keep in mind (objective sense)  
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)  
to remember  
speech-act function  
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
3   100% 
– 
– 
– 
 
The analysis of gemunon leads to the following conclusions. To begin with, one 
can see parallels in the semantic development of geman (first and third person 
singular) and gemunon (first and third person plural). These similarities should 
not be conceived in terms of the frequency of epistemic senses, but rather in 
terms of the mechanism that underlies the divergent development between the 
first and third person singular and plural. In terms of the first person plural 
gemunon, one notices parallels with first person singular geman. In the 10th c., 
the only meaning of gemunon is ‘to be aware of, to keep in mind’ as an objective 
sense, which can be exemplified by the following: 
 
(17) Gemunon we þone halgan drihten. 
 ‘Let us keep in mind the holy God.’ 
(Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58) 
 
In the 10th/11th c., a partly subjective sense emerges, hence a tendency towards 
subjectivity can be seen. Thus, in the 10th/11th c., the Toronto Corpus records 
two senses of gemunon (first person plural); one of them is objective, and the 
other partly subjective: 
 
– objective sense 
(18) Gemunon we þæt we þa god don þe us Godes bec æraþ. 
 ‘Let us keep in mind that we should do good as God’s books teach us.’ 
(Palm Sunday: Morris 1874-84, 65-83) 
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– partly subjective sense 
(19) Gemunon we ure dæghwamlican synna. 
 ‘Let us keep in mind our every-day sins.’ 
(Quinquagesima Sunday: Morris 1874-80, 15-23) 
 
In the 11th c., the recorded senses in gemunon (first person plural) are partly 
subjective ones (67%) and one that is epistemic (33%): 
 
(20) Gemunon we þæt se witiga cwæþ, Hyrat Drihtere mid ege and mid 
hogum. 
 ‘Let us keep in mind what the wise man said, Listen to God with fear 
and care.’ 
(Chrodegang of Metz, Regula Canonicorum: Napier 1916, 1-99) 
 
The sentence presupposes a group of people who met the wise man (individual 
experience) and keep in mind what he said. Thus, the partial subjectivity of the 
sentence is evoked due to the close relation between individual experience and 
abstract, normative values all are aware of: 
 
– remember 
(21) We gemunon hu fela fixa we hæfdon on Egypta lande. 
 ‘We remember how many fish we had in Egypt.’ 
(Numbers: Crawford 1922, 304-32) 
 
The analysis of the third person plural gemunon evokes a different semantic path 
when compared with first person plural gemunon, and a parallel one when 
compared with the third person singular geman. Thus, it appears that the only 
recorded sense of gemunon in the third person plural is an objective one, which 
is also the central one in geman in the third person. In other words, the above 
form shows no traces of subjectivity. 
 
Objective sense: 
(22) Ic mingie þæt hi gemunon þæs preostlican regoles and hæbbon gebodu 
æfre æt foran eagan. 
 ‘I warn that they should be aware of priest’s principles and the prayer 
before their eyes.’ 
(Bury of St. Edmunds, Possessions, Rents and Grants: Robertson 1956, 
no. 104) 
 
The semantic analysis of the second person plural gemunon points to a divergent 
path of development when juxtaposed with the second person singular gemanst. 
The study records two senses dated to the 11th c., one objective and the other 
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partly subjective. Even though the analysis of gemanst indicates only two senses, 
they are both epistemic. The apparent dichotomy between second person 
singular and second person plural can be accounted for by the discourse 
function. Namely, gemanst was used between two interlocutors, while gemunon 
in relation to a larger group of people. Consequently, it was the second person 
plural that evoked evaluative, normative associations and was applied in 
instruction and teaching. Thus, both forms gemanst and gemunon were used in 
different contexts; the former in more personal, informal ones, while the latter 
was used in social, normative, and hence more formal ones. 
 
Objective sense:  
(23) Ge ne gemunon ne ongitaþ þone heofoncundan anweald and þone 
weorþscipe. 
 ‘You are not aware of nor you understand the power of heaven and its 
magnificence. 
(Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy: Sedgefield 1899, 7-149) 
 
(24) Ic myngie þæt ge synt Godes sacerdas and þæt ge gemunon hu mide 
byrþena ge habbaþ  
 underfangen. 
 ‘I advise you/warn you that you are God’s priests and that you keep in 
mind what burden  
 you have undertaken.’ 
(Chrodegang, of Metz, Regula Canonicorum; Napier 1916, 1-99) 
7. Semantic analysis of gemunde 
Similar to geman and gemunon, gemunde will be analysed with a distinction 
made between the first and third person. 
 
gemunde (first person singular past) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
keep in mind (objective sense)  
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)  
to remember  
speech-act function  
– 
3   100% 
– 
– 
– 
1   33% 
2   67% 
– 
– 
2    50% 
1    50% 
– 
 
gemunde (third person singular past) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
keep in mind (objective sense)  
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)  
to remember  
speech-act function  
– 
1   100% 
– 
– 
1…20% 
4    80% 
– 
– 
  3 9% 
28 85% 
  2 6% 
– 
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In looking at the past form gemunde and juxtaposing it with present forms, one 
notices differences in the semantic development of the past when compared to 
the present. To begin with, partly subjective senses seem to be recorded often. 
There are no traces of objective senses for gemunde in the first and third person. 
Yet, similarly to the present tense, the amount of epistemic senses in the first 
person appears to be higher than in the third. The Toronto Corpus records 67% 
in the 10th/11th c. and 50% in the 11th c. of the sense ‘remember’. In contrast, 
in the third person, this epistemic sense constitutes just 6%. 
 
Remember: 
(25) Đa gemunde ic hu ic geseah. 
 ‘I remembered it how I saw it.’ 
(Gregory the Great, The Pastoral Care: Sweet 1871, 3-9) 
 
(26) Ne gemunde þæt he ær þæs gespræc. 
 ‘He did not remember that he talked about it before.’ 
(Beowulf: Dobbie 1953, 3-98) 
 
Moreover, gemunde in the first person is rarely documented, much less so than 
in the third one. Study of the third person gemunde indicates that partly 
subjective senses are frequently recorded. The above sense constitutes 100% in 
the 10th c., 80% in the 10th/11th c. and 85% in the 11th c. of all the senses of 
gemunde. Its general meaning is ‘to be aware of’, yet the subjects of awareness 
are events from one’s individual experience. Thus, while such senses are 
sporadic in present forms, they are numerous in past form gemunde. 
8. Semantic analysis of gemundest and gemundon  
The aim of this section is to analyse the semantics of other past indicative forms, 
hence gemundest (second person singular) and gemundon (first and third person 
plural). It should be emphasised that no contexts of gemundon in the second 
person plural were recorded.  
 
gemundest (second person singular past) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
keep in mind (objective sense)  
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)  
to remember  
speech-act function  
– 
1   100% 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
6   100% 
– 
– 
 
gemundon (first person plural past) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
keep in mind (objective sense)  
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)  
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
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to remember  
speech-act function  
– 
– 
– 
– 
1   100% 
– 
 
gemundon (third person plural past) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
keep in mind (objective sense)  
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)  
to remember  
speech-act function  
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
1   100% 
– 
– 
– 
8   100% 
– 
– 
 
The analysis indicates that the central meaning in the studied forms is partly a 
subjective sense, hence ‘to keep in mind’, when the subjects of awareness are 
events from one’s personal experience. It is the only sense of gemundest in the 
10th c. and 11th c., and in the third person plural gemundon in the 10th/11th c. 
and 11th c. The analysis records only one context when gemundon referred to 
the first person plural, yet its meaning was subjective and epistemic. Thus, one 
should emphasise that the first person in the indicative developed epistemic 
senses prior to other persons. 
The above senses can be exemplified by the following contexts: 
 
– partly subjective 
(27) Lyt þu gemundest to hwan þirne sawle sittan wurde. 
 ‘You were little concerned what happened to your soul afterwards.’ 
(Soul and Body: Krapp 1932a, 54-9) 
 
(28) Ne gemundest þu hwilc hit biþ on helle? 
 ‘Why didn’t you keep in mind how it would be in hell?’ 
(Fourth Sunday after Epiphany: Assmann 1889, 164-9) 
 
(29) He þa gemunde Petrus þæt word þe Crist him ær cwæþ, þæt he him 
sceolde þriwa witsacan ær þam se hana creowe. 
 ‘Peter kept in mind these words Christ told him that he would reject  
 Him three times before the cock crows.’ 
(In Parasceve: Schaefer 1972, 285-314) 
 
– remember 
(30) We gemundon þæt ofter flodas babilones þær we sæ þon.  
 ‘We remember that we were sitting by the rivers of Babilony.’ 
(Psalms, London, British Library: Oess 1910, 26-231) 
9. The juxtaposition of munan and āgan 
The aim of this section is to juxtapose the development of OE munan and āgan 
to indicate that the development of new senses could be initiated by some 
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morphological forms, and only later these new senses were adopted by other 
morphological forms. Munan was not an isolated verb in which the development 
of the epistemic sense evolved in one particular morphological form (first person 
singular). My earlier analyses of OE witan (Wawrzyniak 2006), OE āgan 
(Wawrzyniak 2008) and OE unnan (Wawrzyniak 2010) as well as Aijmer’s 
analysis of will (1985) lead to the assumption that a new sense may evolve in a 
specific context often tied with a certain morphological form and then gradually 
spread to more and more contexts. Hence, this section will not deal with the 
detailed analysis of āgan, which was presented in my earlier study (Wawrzyniak 
2008), but instead it will attempt to show in which morphological forms the 
sense of obligation emerged, and which morphological forms were more prone 
to use the older sense of possession. The analysis of āgan, similarly to munan, 
has been based on the study of all contexts from the Toronto Corpus. 
It should be emphasised that the development of the sense ‘ought to’ did not 
proceed at the same pace in all morphological forms but that some forms were 
more prone to the new sense than others. The distinction between the former 
sense of possession and the latter sense of obligation emerged in certain 
contexts, like Christian speeches, sermons, i.e., contexts emphasising 
community rather than individuals. Consequently, āgan evokes collective rather 
than individual undertones. The obligation sense emerged first in the present 
tense in the first person plural wē and in the third person singular hē, hēo, and 
then was spread analogically in the corresponding past forms. Therefore, the 
form āg / āh when linked with the first person pronoun, did not denote the 
obligation sense but the possession sense. Likewise, āgon related to the first 
person plural by implying a larger group (Christians, community) is attested to 
with the sense ‘ought to’. Likewise, the obligation sense is also central in āgon 
(second person plural present) but not in āhtest (second person singular past), 
where the emphasis is put on the individual. Therefore, it should be emphasised 
that the pronouns referring to an individual retained the former sense in āgan, 
while those denoting a larger group or a community when linked with āgan 
developed the new obligation sense. Consequently, the meaning that emerged in 
this mode had a normative character.  
 
āh / āg (first person singular present) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
to have  
to have the need to  
ought to  
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
1  100 % 
– 
 
āh / āg (third person singular present) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
to have  
to have the need to  
ought to  
5  100% 
– 
– 
4  66% 
2  34% 
– 
4  23% 
9  54 % 
4  23% 
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āgon (first person plural present) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
to have  
to have the need to  
ought to  
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
1  10% 
7  70 % 
2  20% 
 
āgon (third person plural present) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
to have  
to have the need to  
ought to  
1  100% 
– 
– 
2  100% 
– 
– 
1  100% 
– 
– 
 
āhte (first person singular past) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
to have  
ought to  
4  100% 
– 
1  100% 
– 
1   100% 
– 
 
āhte (third person singular past) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
to have  
ought to  
2  100% 
– 
4  80% 
1  20% 
3   75% 
1   25% 
 
āhtest (second person plural past) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
to have 
ought to 
2  100% 
– 
– 
– 
2   100% 
– 
 
āhton (third person plural past) 
 10th c. 10th/11th c. 11th c. 
to have 1   100% – – 
ought to – – – 
10. Conclusion 
The aim of the present analysis was to present the semantic profile of OE 
munan. The study shows that the semantic development of munan was 
contingent on tense, mood and person. Hence, the epistemic function was the 
most frequently used in the first person singular indicative geman, which also 
developed a speech-act function. The subjective, epistemic sense then gradually 
spread to the first person plural indicative gemunon, as well as to the first person 
past forms, singular and plural – gemunde, gemundon. In contrast, the third 
person regardless of the tense and mood did not develop epistemic senses. 
Regarding the second person, the subjective sense developed in the singular 
present, gemanst, and the singular past, gemundest, in discourse, while the 
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second person plural present gemunon records no epistemic senses due to its 
normative character. Moreover, an epistemic function also emerged in the 
infinitive munan, yet the analysis shows no trace of a speech-act function in the 
infinitive. As for the past indicative forms, they record epistemic senses, yet only 
in a marginal number of instances and only in the first person. The semantic 
development in the third person singular did not proceed beyond the 
intermediate stage within Tendency I, thereby giving rise to partly subjective 
senses. 
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Border Crossings – John Montague’s  
The Dead Kingdom 
Péter Dolmányos 
The motif of the journey occupies an important place in John Montague’s 
poetry. Though often recommended to be distrusted, biography offers a 
comfortable support for this – born in Brooklyn, raised in Northern Ireland, 
educated in Dublin and in the United States, the poet became acquainted with 
and accustomed to travel and its consequences from an early age (cf. Montague 
quoted by Dawe 15-16). The poetry, as a result, frequently involves a journey of 
some kind – often in the form of a literal one which in turn develops rich 
metaphorical dimensions that overwrite the original story and which offers a 
wide range of analogies for the contemplation of experience.  
Journeys involve points of departure as well as destinations yet very often it 
is the process itself that acquires principal significance. The allegorical reading 
of life as a journey is an old idea resting on these old assumptions; its long 
history, however, does not diminish its potential powers of illuminating 
experience from less than usual perspectives, and it is also capable, by its very 
nature, of throwing light on the process of illumination by bringing ritualistic 
actions of remembering into the focus of conscious observations.  
Journeys imply progress and process, consist of stations to pass and involve 
borders to cross. There are differences between stages of the journey which are 
observable from various perspectives; yet there is a paradoxical element 
involved in this phenomenon as there is continuous progress along the way and 
the successive stages are separated from each other by arbitrarily drawn 
interfaces comfortably called borders – change is observable but the exact end of 
one stage and the beginning of the next is a rather elusive concept. This can lead 
to the reconsideration and the reassessment of the category of the border, and the 
concept can be destabilised as a consequence, which in turn can further 
illuminate experience and its interpretation. 
The occasion for John Montague’s collection The Dead Kingdom (1984) is 
the death of the mother of the poet and her funeral. The collection takes the 
frame of a journey from the south of the Republic to the North, her former 
residence and also the scene of the poet’s childhood. The poems charter a rich 
territory: the landscape, the concept of change, the troubled history of Ireland 
and the not any less troubled family history of the poet mark the field and the 
scope of the collection. Its principal genre is the elegy, one of the favourites of 
Montague: it is a genre that involves an imaginative reconstruction of the past 
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and a number of imaginative border crossings along the way. There is a crossing 
of a border in bringing to a present (textual) life past events, facts and persons 
(the motif of the “nekiya, the hero’s descent into the underworld” (Johnston 
198)), and there is also an act of remembering, the crossing of a border from the 
present to the past.  
Montague’s technique in The Dead Kingdom is similar to the one he 
employed earlier in his seminal The Rough Field: short lyrics are organised into 
a sequence of epic qualities, the individual poems thus acquire significant 
additional dimensions pointing beyond their usual lyric structure and the 
collection becomes more than a sum of its parts. The implications of the epic 
involve certain technical elements, and Montague favours a straight line of 
development in the structure rather than the circular patterns involved in The 
Rough Field. Chronology is consistent on the whole, and the journey’s progress 
in space is undisturbed by digressions as the persona observes his surroundings 
and conducts his meditations on the inescapable historical dimensions of the 
Irish landscape. Communal history intersects with personal history, and the last 
two sections of the collection focus on the imaginative recreation of the family 
circle, thus the journey across Ireland is simultaneously a journey back in time, 
yet in a curious way the vision remains stereoscopic as the persona retains his 
awareness of the present and also of the ‘pastness’ of the past. In this way 
borders are crossed, and borders are observed and kept intact at the same time. 
This inherent ambiguity is connected with the paradox of the elegy as a genre – 
that there is a process of falsification involved in recollecting the past, what is 
recollected is never identical with the experience itself. 
The first instance of border crossing is the opening poem of the collection: 
the news of his mother’s death is communicated to the poet. On hearing the 
news he returns from the sea to the shore: he comes from water to land, from a 
fluid and changing world to the solid one; the sense of being kept comfortably 
afloat is replaced by a hard and clear sense of reality, of inevitable change. There 
is another contrast involved in this picture as the salmons’ annual northward 
journey to the source opens the account – the poet’s own northward journey to 
his ‘source’, the scene of his childhood and the figure of his mother, however, is 
not grounded in the notion of fertility but is occasioned by death.  
The northward journey in the car with the cousin thus begins in a vaguely in 
medias res manner. The experience of moving past the landscape induces a 
parallel with the notion of the process of change – the poems explore not only 
the contemplated landscape but the concept of change intimated by elements in 
the landscape. All this is underwritten by another sense of change, one that 
involves a shift in the persona’s mental world, reflected in his interpretation of 
the landscape. The bogs of the central part of Ireland are waterlogged places of 
peace and memories; the peacefulness of the landscape repeatedly implies 
timelessness yet there are also concrete events recollected from the childhood of 
the persona, suggesting a tangible temporal dimension, which preserves the 
ambiguous tension of the journey. As the border between the Republic and the 
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North is approached the harsher elements of the Northern landscape take over: 
its glacial memories and memorials imply a less consoling sight and a 
corresponding mental atmosphere as the persona gets closer in both space and 
time to the event that has prompted the journey.  
The memories evoked by the landscape and certain concrete places are 
private ones at first. They are apparently randomly recollected, yet they give the 
impression of a happy past, very much in contrast with the present in which the 
contemplated scenes are neglected and miss the order imposed upon them by 
human presence. This is what happens in the poem “Abbeylara”: the fond 
memories of a near idyllic past – “In the garden at Abbeylara / it was always 
summer” (Montague 131) – are replaced by images of a chaotic and overgrown 
garden in the present after the death of the inhabitants, “as if they had never 
been” (Montague 131). The conclusion of the poem implies the omnipresence of 
change with strong negative overtones as the futility of human endeavour for 
imposing patterns on the world is suggested by the closing line. The conditional, 
however, also implies a sense of ‘but’, an insistence on the fact that the people 
recollected indeed existed in the past.  
The personal memories progressively give way to communal ones – myth, 
legend and ‘actual’ history replace the childhood episodes as the journey 
unfolds. The communal aspects imply a more profound and more serious 
concern with the past, yet the prominence of mythic and legendary elements at 
once point toward the importance of the extra-rational dimensions in that past 
and in its human assessment. The seemingly monotonous and peaceful landscape 
shelters surprising memories, and violence intrudes as Montague does not intend 
to romanticise the historical dimension. The tradition of dinnseanchas, the Irish 
lore of place is revised as personal nostalgia is inescapable along this particular 
journey yet communal history serves as a reminder of patterns beyond the 
individual and the omnipresence of the tragic in a wider national context.  
The journey from the Republic to the North inescapably involves the 
crossing of the border between the two countries. The political border normally 
reads as a clear-cut physical location whose whereabouts are marked with 
utmost precision; in this case, however, the concept comes under thorough 
revision. The account of the crossing is given in the poem with the laconic title 
“Border”. The persona’s anxiety rises despite his frequent experience of the 
crossing of that border during his childhood as this particular instance is 
different due to the occasion itself. The most recent history of the North also 
contributes to the persona’s unease since the “sand-bagged / barracks of Rosslea, 
Derrylin” (Montague 154) indicate that the place of arrival is a land of ongoing 
conflict. As a result, the crossing becomes a nearly acrobatic manoeuvre:  
 
60 Péter Dolmányos 
Under Quilca Mountain 
inching the car across 
a half-bombed bridge, 
trespassing, zigzagging 
over potholed roads (Montague 154) 
The short lines Montague chooses to employ reflect the claustrophobic 
conditions of the crossing yet at the same time they would also urge a quick 
downward movement in the stanza by their very brevity, which creates a tension 
that corresponds to the anxiety of the speaker.  
The crossing is eventually completed, and the persona arrives at the land 
after a succession of alterations:  
 
 post- 
   boxes, now green, now red, 
   alternately halted by British 
   patrols, unarmed gardaí, 
   signs in Irish and English, 
   both bullet-pierced (Montague 154)  
 
The tactics of listing the two sets of distinct landmarks transforms alteration into 
alternation, thus the passage creates the impression of oscillation rather than that 
of straight and steady movement forward, which further undermines the usual 
expectations concerning the concept of the physical border. The transformation 
becomes complete with the persona’s assessment of the destination – he steps  
 
 into 
   that shadowy territory  
   where motives fail, where 
   love fights death,  
   good falters before evil. (Montague 154) 
 
The indicated destination is vague and general enough to be any place, and it is 
exactly this deliberate undermining of anything concrete and tangible that 
Montague needs for his further progress towards a reconsideration of his family 
history.  
The event of the crossing in these particular circumstances initiates 
profound changes in the subsequent poems as Montague turns from the 
communal to the personal and private again. In “The Plain of Blood”, the first 
poem to follow “Border”, the change is already observable. This poem appears 
to continue the pattern laid down in the earlier sections of the collection as the 
landscape is read in terms of its mythic heritage encoded in its name. The 
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speaker, however, becomes rather pragmatic in dismissing myth and identifying 
“wise imperial policy” (Montague 155) as the more tangible cause of the 
conflict. Though a pair of poems, a curse and a blessing answering each other, 
follow, and there is a poem conducting a meditation on several deities, the 
communal and mythologizing drive is eventually renounced and the persona 
focuses his attention on his own family history in the last two sections of the 
collection.  
The change in focus goes together with a change in perspective as the 
present is virtually dismissed and the account descends into the past. The 
exploration of the family history is centred around repeated visits to the North 
and the belated forming of relationships between son, father and mother. 
Chronology is handled in a less rigorous manner than so far, and the internal 
world of memory takes a more prominent role at the expense of the outside 
world of the landscape and of contemporary events. 
The poem “Gravity”, which opens the penultimate section of the collection, 
is built on the temporal contrast of the persona’s wife expecting a child and his 
dying mother. This situation also implies borders – these are borders yet to be 
crossed, and the opposing emotional associations of childbirth and death suspend 
the poem in a state of tension. This tension is further upheld by the persona’s 
decision of not telling his mother about his new marriage after the disintegration 
of his previous one as he does not want to upset the mother’s beliefs resting on 
“an antique code” (Montague 162).  
The sight of the weakening mother induces a series of poems which trace 
the mother’s life – from the perspective of the persona. The poem “Intimacy” is 
framed by the episodes of watching films together with his mother as the 
principal means of getting closer to each other. The first scene of this forming 
relationship is the cinema to which the grown son takes his mother; in the 
absence of the father she is “rigged out like a girlfriend / in her evening finery” 
(Montague 163), and they watch romances as these provide a comfortable 
escape from “real life” (Montague 163), both in the general and in their 
particular case. A brief reflection on the sad family history, and of the mother’s 
“melancholy destiny” (Montague 164) brings the father back into the picture, 
only to remove him again by referring to the brief family reunion which lasts 
until the father’s death. In accordance with the time shift the public world of the 
cinema is replaced by the private one of the home as the television offers similar 
comforts to those of the former scene, and the shift in location suggests a greater 
degree of intimacy between mother and son in the final and irreversible absence 
of the father. The picture, however, is once again one of ambiguity, as the retreat 
from the public scene to the private one is also an act of resignation, of the 
acceptance of a situation by circumstance rather than by choice. 
The brief summing up of the mother’s “melancholy destiny” compels a 
more detailed reflection on the family history in the next poem of the collection 
(“Molly Bawn”). There is a set of pictures of the mother as a young woman, her 
courtship and marriage, and there is also the inevitable catastrophic intersection 
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of communal and personal histories as her brothers are traced in the family 
narrative. The abrupt end of the poem with the image of emigration, in their case 
to Brooklyn at the beginning of the Great Depression, is also the rather abrupt 
end of her potential happiness – the ironic phrasing (“making sure to land in / 
good time for the Depression!” (Montague 165)) gives the impression as if the 
occasion were ultimately responsible for her (and the family’s) miseries.  
The end of the poem is at once the starting point of the next one, “A Muddy 
Cup”. The image of the cup is the mother’s experience of emigration – her 
decision to follow her husband with their children reaches a rather bitter climax 
in her unexpected arrival at the father’s lodgings, and the subsequent fight ends 
in a reconciliation involving the consumption of the persona. This appears to be 
one of the key moments of the family story, and it is followed by a similar one 
when the mother returns to Ireland with the three sons but refuses to take the 
youngest one (the persona) into her care, sending him away to the relatives of 
the father to a nearby yet distant farm. 
The persona then directs his attention to the father, left behind in Brooklyn. 
Tellingly, Montague chooses a Christmas scene to evoke his father’s figure – he 
is seen as a man pulling his sons, all three of them, on a sleigh. The apparent 
harmony of the image is quickly dissolved, however, as his future is briefly 
outlined – vanishing family, loneliness, unemployment and drinking await him. 
At the end of the poem mutual confessions reduce the distance of father and son 
yet the eventual breaking down of unease between them is delayed until a 
special occasion, that of a broadcast made by the persona which merits the 
admiration of the father, however laconic that may be.  
The restoration, or perhaps of the proper forming for the first time, of the 
normal relation between father and son marks the beginning of a wider family 
reunion. This takes the image of a silver flask which goes around as the family 
travels to Midnight Mass, and the picture is completed by the presence of the 
same set of decorations which embellished their last Christmas in Brooklyn. 
This scene, bordering on the melodramatic, however, is not maintained for long 
t: the episode remains the only one of its kind in the family account. As such it is 
sharply contrasted with the succeeding poem of the collection which is entitled 
“Last Journey.” The persona, in spite of the specific temporal element of the 
title, refuses to provide the exact details of the journey just as he omits the 
definite article which usually accompanies the adjective “last” – neither time nor 
destination is specified. This decision freezes the moment and liberates the 
persona from the compulsion of a neat closure – there is an emphasis on the 
progress in the account, and there is a refusal of crossing that border which is 
suggested by “last.”  
The last section of the collection begins with a piece focusing on the 
process of dying yet there are no personal details specified within it. Instead 
there is the intimation of another border, that of family secrets, which are 
threatened by the process itself and which may come under scrutiny by younger 
generations. The implications of this become clear when the persona’s tactics are 
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revealed – refusing to address his mother’s death, he recalls the death of his 
maternal grandmother instead, thus making the previous generation the matrix of 
the one whose passing he is compelled to face. This refusal to discuss the 
mother’s death is paralleled with his scrupulous avoidance of giving an account 
of the father’s death, which appears to be the expression of a reluctance in 
crossing one inevitable border – or at least, of a reluctance of assessing it. 
The persona’s physical journey has its destination in the funeral of the 
mother. The account, corresponding in mood to the occasion, concentrates on 
cold and hostile details, and the old physical distance keeping son from mother 
is emblematically retained for the night preceding the event as the persona and 
his cousin spend the night in the childhood home of the poet, seven miles from 
the mother’s home. The funeral embodies that ambiguity which underlies the 
whole collection, of the constant state of change and the simultaneous presence 
of continuity and discontinuity: inherited “old terrors” (Montague 178) and the 
seemingly unchanging world in which the mother lived in the same place where 
her mother had lived before reflect continuity, while the persona’s exclusion 
from this world in childhood and his present refusal of joining “this narrowing 
world / of bigotry and anger” (Montague 179) represent the discontinuity in the 
process of change. In this stereoscopic vision, life is also seen in the duality of 
the continuity of consciousness and the constant change of the body through its 
cycles of seven years of full renewal. Bodily change is read as “minor deaths” 
(Montague 179), repeated over and over until the last one which is curiously 
understood as “a freedom” (Montague 179), finding its proper metaphor in “a 
light battling through cloud” (Montague 179), which points towards a profound 
belief in a superior world of transcendence. 
The event of the funeral is recalled in the poem “Northern Lights”. The 
account begins with the image of wild geese, imaginatively identified with the 
spirits of the newly dead, and concludes with a short passage on the 
phenomenon denoted by the title, echoing the popular superstition that “by 
whistling you could / bring them nearer” (Montague 179). The mystery is only 
partially dissolved by identifying Aurora Borealis as the interaction of magnetic 
particles in the upper atmosphere; the haunting vision of the lights remains “our 
sky’s virid necklace” (Montague 179). The constantly changing play of light 
which is only visible at night becomes the proper image of Montague’s mission: 
the mother’s figure (and that of the father too, in its turn) is only possible to 
observe in its entirety when she is no longer around, it can only be fully 
possessed when it is no longer present. 
The physical journey may end here but the metaphorical one still continues 
– the mother’s funeral is not the final resting point of the narrative. The 
completion of the mother’s image needs a final readjustment, one that soothes 
the tension created by the event of the funeral. The basic question echoes the 
painful paradox of a childhood without parents: “How can one make an absence 
flower, / lure a desert to sudden bloom?” (Montague 180) The consequences of 
the absence of the mother are distressing – a nearly unquenchable thirst for love, 
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speech impediment and repeated instances of humiliation; yet this situation 
occasions the persona’s discovery of poetry as well, balancing the account to 
some extent. 
The absence is also responsible for the unceasing interest of the persona in 
seeking explanation for his case of maternal rejection. The already grown man 
decides to meet his mother and to make himself known to her, though this is 
done solely on his initiative. The final reproach to the mother, however, is 
balanced by a nearly miraculous condition which is only learnt when she is dead: 
despite all her apparent rejection of him, she was still unable to part totally with 
him:  
 
I never knew, until you were gone, 
that, always around your neck,  
you wore an oval locket 
with an old picture in it,  
of a child in Brooklyn. (Montague 183)  
 
This closure is indeed somewhat melodramatic yet it possesses the power for the 
benevolent readjustment of the whole picture as a result. Questions still persist, 
though, since the mother’s choice of the image instead of her son receives little 
attention in the end. 
The last two poems of the collection focus on the notion of change and 
there is a brief account of the journey back. The return is made from the past to 
the present and there is also a hint at the future through the image of the cradled 
infant of the poet (whose birth is also omitted from the account), which restores 
the usual awareness of time and its inevitability. The persona, in a strongly 
Yeatsean manner, renounces his earlier nostalgia and concludes the sequence 
with an Inuit saying: “’To walk away, without / looking back, or crying”’ 
(Montague 185), yet this retains the ambiguity which characterises the whole 
collection: the persona’s insistence on retracing the family history stands 
opposed to this conclusion, but the picture has been completed and the return is 
now possible to make. 
The poems of The Dead Kingdom repeatedly call attention to the natural 
parallel of moving North. References to the annual northward journey of the 
salmon and the wild geese recur, and the “wavering needle” of the compass is 
repeatedly evoked, as if all these formed an inescapable constituent of life. The 
North possesses a profound significance in Montague’s own context due to his 
Northern upbringing and his mother’s home, making it indeed something of a 
magnetic pole or a centre of gravity. The implications of the North as a location, 
however, are also strong: its cold, dark and increasingly hostile nature to human 
habitation form an inseparable association in the poet’s mind in his vision of the 
journey and its conditions – the movement away from the comfortable and 
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happy present to the tormented world of the past is paralleled by the physical 
movement from the south to the north. 
In the course of this journey the motif of the actual border crossing acquires 
special importance. The destabilised image of the border and the arrival in a 
metaphoric world of anywhere suggest the omnipresence and omnipotence of 
change and the impossibility of standing still. The still point is an illusion only, 
the construct of the human mind – just as the interpretation of character is a 
mental construct. The speaker’s reconstruction of the father and mother figures 
is also a process of creation, a constant rewriting and readjustment of their 
images, which has a range of implications with a strong sense of ambiguity: the 
lasting wound is perhaps also possible to heal and the broken family circle may 
be imaginatively completed, yet all this is tentative only. 
Montague’s tactics of deliberately employing ambiguity in the course of his 
journey creates tension and suggests an honest acknowledgement of the 
simultaneous presence of two sides to every situation. The two sides hint at the 
presence of borders between them and the crossing of these borders facilitate the 
scrutiny of them. The concept of the border in general is also examined and its 
basically illusory nature is revealed: it is a category created for convenience yet 
it becomes evasive when put under closer scrutiny. From a more distant 
perspective the difference is seen, the border in between is observable yet when 
getting closer to the contemplated scene it becomes increasingly less concrete 
and tangible, giving way to a set of infinitesimal differences and eliminating the 
sense of neat interfaces and dividing lines. The present flows into the past, actual 
experience modulates into memory and life unfolds in the dichotomy of birth 
and death, the only borders which may be considered tangible – both of which 
remain essentially unaddressed in their actual occurrence in Montague’s 
account.  
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Ambiguity in The French Lieutenant’s Woman 
Tibor Tóth 
IN MEMORIAM KATHLEEN DUBS 
 
John Fowles’ sense of humour, subtle irony and his admiration for 
the magic power of art generated ever new interpretations of 
ambiguity in his major works and in his non fiction. His The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman is an excellent example in this respect 
and I would like to approach his presentation of ambiguity in the 
above novel in its relationship to the principle of the freedom that 
allows for other freedoms to exist, the thesis of the reality as real as 
but other, viz., more real than the reality that exists and the 
problematic meeting of pre-modernist, modernist and post- modern 
fiction in this novel. 
John Fowles’ interest in the individual’s need for freedom results in 
characteristic modes of expression and technical solutions which help him 
rewrite both traditional stereotypes and contemporary theoretical, scientific or 
technical developments. John Fowles’ books simultaneously reflect on 
contemporary non-literary aspects which influence the individual’s possibilities 
in the twentieth century and stress the peripheral status of the existential in the 
context of the aesthetic alternatives described.  
This authorial attitude directs attention to the inherent ambiguity clearly 
formulated in The French Lieutenant’s Woman, where John Fowles declares that 
his main or ‘principal’ concern is not with authority but with freedom and that 
he is ready to sacrifice the exclusive quality of the two above categories and 
‘democratise’ them: “The novelist is still a god, since he creates […] in the new 
theological image, with freedom our first principle, not authority” (F. L. W.: 97).  
In the same novel John Fowles actually declares that freedom and authority 
are not exclusive of one another, rather he asserts that they are inclusive of 
different interpretations, and thus can become the source of constant 
(dis)ambiguity. This is so because freedom is not defined qua freedom but it is 
declared to be a category that allows for other freedoms, which means that there 
is a ‘central’ if not a dominant form of freedom, which can give permission for 
other forms of freedom to exist. This formula also suggests that the author is 
ready to share his freedom with some of his characters and it even formulates the 
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possibility that the artist’s freedom can benefit from the partial results of his 
characters’ search for freedom. 
The key formula could be that Sarah Woodruff has access to her author’s 
creativity which translates that John Fowles and Sarah have the ambiguous, 
possibly interchangeable status of author-character or character- author in the 
novel. John Fowles not only stresses the centrality of ambiguity in this novel, but 
also obsessively questions its influence on the novel as a genre.  
When John Fowles discusses freedom in the proximity of authority, he 
asserts that the novelist’s authority is maintained with the modification that it 
allows for other authorities. This paradox is present in nearly all his works but 
The French Lieutenant’s Woman is perhaps the best example in this respect. 
This is so as the novel is a vigorous 20
th
 century variant of the Victorian novel, 
which presents its ‘lead’ against a realistically described nineteenth century 
social, philosophical and historical background which is occasionally 
reinterpreted and fragmented by the fictionally theoretical comments and two 
intrusions by the twentieth century novelist; thus we can say that one of the most 
important protagonists in the novel is the novel itself.  
This also means that in The French Lieutenant’s Woman the authorial 
intrusions, a series of theoretical sections, as well as the multiple endings, 
employ the Victorian material as the very subject and object of theoretical and 
practical, of fictional and real examination and experiment. This relatively 
complicated situation does not undermine the possibility of a ‘perfect’ Victorian 
novel, but John Fowles signals his conviction that this solution is merely one 
among many, as in his interpretation the author’s dominance is just one of the 
numerous aspects that influence the fictional material.  
Analysis, experiment, dissolving the boundaries between literary history, 
theory or fiction writing as well as the role and presence of the author become 
possibilities which are asserted, exercised and also questioned as fictional 
material in the novel and John Fowles even dedicates chapters thirteen and sixty-
one to the theoretical discussion of the above aspects. The form could be termed 
fictional essay, or fictional theory.  
The above paradox results from the very nature of John Fowles’ 
interpretation of fiction, as in his concept the fiction of all periods has reflected on 
itself to a certain degree (Fowles 1977: 137). This introspection gains prominence 
and is made into a visible process in the so-called self-reflexive novel fashionable 
in the second half of the twentieth century (Waugh 1984: 162).  
His characters are in an extremely difficult situation because they exist in 
an ambiguous world, a Victorian one which nevertheless is dominated by 
postmodern interpretations, and this ambiguity results in a double-voiced 
rhetoric and a dimension where the rules of the world ‘as real as the world that 
is’ make sense only for those protagonists who know that Victorian certainties 
are being challenged by the intrusion of postmodern avalanche of doubts.  
To create this sort of useful ambiguity John Fowles employs different 
Victorian and earlier works of art, scientific or social approaches freely as a kind 
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of ‘raw’ material in The French Lieutenant’s Woman and the author and the title 
character manipulate them freely so it does not surprise us that the title of the 
novel is not consistent with its plot. If I interpret the plot in a conventional way I 
have to admit that it is extremely, perhaps too simple. Ernestina Freeman, the 
only child of a rich businessman and Charles Smithson a young man of 
aristocratic extraction are walking on the beach when the young man catches 
sight of poor Tragedy, a mysterious woman. This meeting is going to change the 
fates of the three participants in the ménage. Charles proposes to Ernestina and 
even discusses the financial terms of their marriage with his would be father in 
law, but meetings with Sarah Woodruff motivate him to first try and help the 
desperate woman, an action which later leads him into an illicit affair with her. 
The conventional ending to this story reconciles Charles to Ernestina and Sarah 
Woodruff disappears from their happy Victorian married life. But the novel has 
other endings in store and this means that the ending both occurred and it did 
not….  
John Fowles even apologizes for having offered his readers a flat ending 
and a collection of essays as a novel, but this is also an impossible possibility. 
The cause and effect principle remains intact and the somewhat ambiguous 
credibility of the story will stand the test of even the most critical reader in the 
end due to a series of technical subtleties John Fowles employs. The novel 
abounds in explicit authorial intrusions, which loosen the steady Victorian 
context and this narrative strategy allows for two more solutions to the conflict, 
which establish, and emphasise the central role of the French lieutenant’s 
woman in the above-summarised first section. 
This situation directs our attention to the liberal handling of the fictional 
material, which results in promises the novel does not honour. There is no 
seducer in the novel and for most of the novel we witness a young virgin’s 
preparations to become somebody’s woman rather than a fallen woman’s 
struggle to fight against the attacks of Victorian society. In fact, all predictable 
interpretations are undermined because Sarah’s status does not make sense, 
cannot make sense, to most of the nineteenth century characters in the novel.  
The title promises to offer the life story of a tragic figure seduced and 
abandoned, or further abused, terrorised and humiliated by a merciless seducer. 
Yet, as I have just argued, in the novel there is no seducer, no acts that humiliate 
a weak innocent woman. On the contrary, we discover that the French 
lieutenant’s woman is the result of Sarah’s ‘creativity’ and she becomes a 
seductress who manipulates Charles Smithson. The harvest of the seeds of 
ambiguity is sweet and sour as our interpretation of her status is partly the result 
of expectations generated by our knowledge of the Victorian fictional variants of 
the theme, but the possibility of some sort of progress or deviation from these 
principles has been asserted by the time we try to make sense of the situation.  
The above discrepancy between the promise formulated by the title and the 
actual events, which construct the plot, can be interpreted as a kind of warning 
addressed to the reader. The shocking revelation, that Sarah Woodruff is still a 
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virgin, and that her status as a fallen woman, is the result of her own ‘fiction’ 
created in the company of John Fowles alters the nature of the book 
considerably.  
Her determination to confront a prejudiced and hostile Victorian 
environment is conventional enough, but it becomes the source of creative ‘play’ 
and the same can be said of the novel, which is and is not Victorian. Thus Sarah 
Woodruff’s career most notably demonstrates that she differs from other 
Victorian heroines through her, and her creator’s choice of the form of rebellion, 
and the same can be said about the novel itself. 
With a bit of exaggeration we could say that she employs the power of 
tradition and stereotypes for her own benefit while projecting herself into a 
characteristic Victorian conflict she simultaneously amends the nature and 
character of the predictable fictional medium as well. The formula, the power of 
her ‘authorial’ will is fully justified, as in chapter thirteen John Fowles claims 
that he has no genuine control over his characters’ acts as once they achieve 
their own identity they enter into a dimension over which the artist has no 
control or has very limited authority:  
I can only report – and I am the most reliable witness – that the idea 
seemed to me to come early from Charles, not myself. I must respect it, 
and disrespect all my quasi-divine plans for him, if I wish him to be 
real. […] There is only one good definition of God: the freedom that 
allows other freedoms to exist. (F.L.W. 82) 
Yet Sarah has an ambiguous status as although she lives in the Victorian period, 
her material existence is determined by the given physical and historical 
dimension of the novel and at the same time she is the ‘accomplice’ of the 
twentieth century novelist. The complexity of the novel stems partly from this 
first platform of ambiguity, suggested by the fact that the environment she exists 
in is one she manages to both inhabit and evade with the help of her creative 
power and the support of the twentieth century novelist. Of course her creative 
power is the product of John Fowles’ imagination, but the author insists on this 
sense of ambiguity.  
The ambiguity element is essential at this point as she is a pariah, an outcast 
in the given microcosm, yet she is the only character who is aware of the nature 
of the situation and benefits from ambiguity and her career occasionally can be 
identified as near-identical with the process by way of which John Fowles 
imagines, plans, organises, writes and offers up his fictional material to the 
readers of his book.  
This state of affairs constantly reminds us that we are discussing a novel, 
which is constructed on the principle of ambiguity as it is and it is not a 
Victorian one. Sarah’s dual existence, her ambiguous nature, is determined by 
the unavoidable shadow of tradition, as well as by her, her author’s and ‘their’ 
novel’s rebellion against a ‘once’ admittedly ideal world or mode of 
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presentation. Sarah gains her right to dismiss Victorian illusions in a Victorian 
world because she is at the same time, admittedly, the product of twentieth 
century imagination and thus John Fowles formulates his and her right to 
dismiss the limits of both Victorian and twentieth century fiction by 
demonstrating that fiction is centuries old and eternally fresh and young 
simultaneously. 
Through this duality the novel extends the power of creative, artistic 
imagination to the domain of cultural dimensions other than literature to 
demonstrate that the illusion of art changing life has to and can be maintained. 
This illusion is clearly formulated by John Fowles in the very title of one of his 
essays, which announces in loosely Descartesian terms “I write therefore I am” 
(Fowles 1964: 5-12), which could be an excellent explanation of Sarah and the 
‘life’ she is creating for herself and her consorts in the company of John Fowles.  
Sarah Woodruff’s greatest power stems from her creative manipulation of 
already existing social, moral and most notably fictional patterns and the 
tempting quality of the image she creates of herself is, as Pamela Cooper rightly 
puts it “a constant fata morgana of great influence” (Cooper 1991: 62).  
The innocent woman who either falls in love with a man, or is simply 
seduced or raped by a man and thus becomes a pariah has been a common topic 
in world literature. Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Hester Prynne, Thomas Hardy’s Tess 
d’Urberfield revealed already functioning social and moral stereotypes of the 
respective periods in America and Britain. These tragic figures were victims of 
hypocrisy, social and moral ignorance, but in John Fowles’ novel the victim is a 
victimiser and relevantly she creates this ambiguity for reasons we have already 
discussed.  
The above anachronistic elements, the underlying sense of ambiguity, 
become explainable and organic through the chapters of John Fowles’ fiction, 
which discuss theoretical aspects concerning the novel and the novelist. Sarah’s 
‘writing’ of her own fate also enables the novel to reveal the process by way of 
which the ‘dominant’ character deconstructs the myth of both the pure woman 
and that of the fallen woman and thus the fallen woman can be interpreted as the 
pure woman and the pure woman can be equated with the fallen one. This is also 
the case in Thomas Hardy’s A Pure Woman as well, but John Fowles’ intention 
is to suggest that a mysterious and beautiful woman’s version of her own 
miserable or dignified fate is a valid possibility.  
This possibility belongs to the domain of illusions, but creating valid 
interpretations of reality as illusion is part of human nature and of fiction and 
functions as a perfect source of useful ambiguity. David W. Landrum writes that 
John Fowles employs this technique to help the reader assess his or her personal 
reactions to the events related:  
As certainties crumble one after another, restoration and emancipation 
pattern that eventually extends from the characters in the novel to the 
author, the reader, and the text itself. Incessant shifting from one centre 
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to another, followed by the dislocation of each newly established 
centre, gives the novel much of its rhetorical energy and provides it 
with a unifying thematic dimension that substitutes for a formulaic 
thesis. (Landrum 1996: 103) 
Occasional theoretical intrusions into the fictional material support the 
ambiguous nature of the material, and function in the sense suggested by 
Bradbury’s idea that the novel imposes at least two readings from the 
perspectives of all three explicitly formulated endings (Bradbury 1993: 178). 
We are quite often reminded that we are reading a text, which is different 
from traditional variants in that its achievements have to be assessed at a 
theoretical level as ambiguity if we are to employ the most relevant 
interpretations it suggests. One has to read the novel, simultaneously, as an 
exciting twentieth century interpretation of its Victorian grandfather and as the 
grandfather’s critique of how his grandchildren are wasting the once praised, 
accepted stable values of the ‘domain.’  
Of course all the members of the extended ‘family’ of fiction (ethics, 
science, history, literary theory, contemporary fiction, or poetry) have a say, but 
none of them ‘wants’ to take the responsibility for anything that might or has 
gone wrong. Yet, The French Lieutenant’s Woman is not a fictional comparative 
cultural study of the second half of the Victorian period and of the twentieth 
century. The most provocative aspect of the novel is that Sarah’s art, or 
imagination makes of life an uglier existential dimension than it actually is 
because she builds up her official image of a multitude of possible roots of 
negative aesthetics. Yet the moral verdict of the Victorian world turns against 
the whole period as in its concept a young woman’s love for a man is sin, her 
fidelity and longing to see him again is not compatible with Victorian morality, 
her tragedy is translatable as prostitution and the names given to her are 
Tragedy, the French lieutenant’s woman, and ultimately the French lieutenant’s 
whore.  
She generates her ‘public image’ and when the underlying sense of 
ambiguity is revealed the result is a more flexible interpretation of the artificer’s, 
that is her and her author’s, possibilities. The above thesis is documented by the 
verifiable fictional fact brilliantly demonstrated by Katherine Tarbox, who states 
that the multiple endings of the novel mainly reflect on Sarah’s possibilities 
(Tarbox 1988: 72). 
The fact that Sarah is playing the role of a fallen woman and is determined 
to confront the hostile environment through the false image she designs and 
enacts highlights another relevant aspect regarding the insistence of the 
Fowlesian meta-realistic novel on the potential values of such ambiguity. Once 
Sarah’s pretence is revealed the novel can start discarding its false interpretation 
as a traditional but limited Victorian novel and it directs our attention to its 
postmodern, willingly ambiguous ‘identity’. This ‘expertise’ includes Ernestina 
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and Charles’s marriage, the shocking meeting of Sarah and Charles, and the 
impossibility of any kind of meeting of Charles with either woman. 
The gain is as obvious as the authorial intention ‘written’ in the novel 
because the reader also learns that fiction has the power to incorporate essay 
writing, philosophy, history, science, religion, literature, the theory of the novel 
and, more importantly, display its quality as an artistic process in progress where 
any conclusive, definite ending is false and only stems from too much respect 
for or abdication to stereotypes.  
In “Hardy and the Hag” John Fowles justifies his option for the multiple 
ending solution not on the basis of objective critical reasons but writes that he 
considers it to be more fertile to his whole being as a writer. In the same essay 
John Fowles makes an interesting statement regarding Charles’s status and the 
author’s relationship with his male protagonist: “I wrote and printed two endings 
to The French Lieutenant’s Woman entirely because from early in the first draft I 
was torn intolerably between wishing to reward the male protagonist (my 
surrogate) with the woman he loved and wishing to deprive him of her […]” 
(Fowles 1977: 145). 
The dangers of this kind of manipulation are also formulated in the novel. 
Charles Smithson, the ‘clean angel’ (Angel Clare) of the novel is in a more 
delicate and difficult situation than Sarah Woodruff because although he senses 
the ‘mythic aura’ that defends her against the whole world he cannot abandon 
his convention bound interpretation of a still acceptable pattern of behaviour. 
This means that the ‘surrogate’ is a Fowlesian projection of Victorian mentality 
still active in the mind of twentieth century artists. This is a reflection of the 
ambiguity John Fowles had been uneasy with all his life. It is easy to 
demonstrate that Charles’ mentality is both Victorian (as he is ready to discuss 
the financial aspects of his marriage with his prospective father in law, or has no 
respect for Sam) and rebellious (his views, and his attitude towards Sarah). 
These aspects are consistent with the ending suggested in chapter forty-
four, but John Fowles simply calls this ending a work-hypothesis, a might have 
been solution and the fairly traditional ending is offered up only to be rewritten. 
John Fowles’ sympathy for Charles is limited, the author shows his surrogate as 
the first existentialist following the coffin, which carries the corpse of his extinct 
Darwinist convictions yet he is not free to imagine and to create or to construct 
the world he would like to live in.  
As the second and the third endings seem to suggest this ‘authorial’ 
ambition we may say that Charles, the ‘surrogate’, is enslaved by verifiable 
dimensions of the material world and is incapable of living in an illusion because 
he cannot sense the value of ambiguity relentlessly reformulated by Sarah and 
John Fowles. This is a very interesting sort of alliance between the author and 
his female protagonist against his surrogate. Charles Smithson revolts against 
art, very late in the novel, in the house of the Pre-Raphaelite artist and thus 
demonstrates that there is no hope for him to change, although he senses his 
status as a ‘fossil’.  
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In fact, at the level of the plot Sarah Woodruff’s strategy is successful 
because she refuses to accept the conventions of her contemporary society and 
she willingly disregards the spirit of the period. Sarah Woodruff pretends to be a 
fallen woman, a miserable victim of her uncontrolled passion, a possible 
mistress, a woman who is ready to marry the man who renounces the financial 
advantages offered up to him by life, a muse for artists, and finally a woman 
liberated by her status in all respects. This strategy generates her mobility as a 
fictional character and the transformation of her status is interpretable as 
freedom if her new possibilities are weighed against the lack of mobility of the 
other characters or of ‘the world other than the world that is’.  
First, of course she has to pretend that she is bad, because her status as a 
bad woman guarantees her the freedom to credibly suggest all the above 
‘unfulfilled promises’ and to provoke discussion of related moral, ethical, social 
and aesthetic problems. She does not actually lie because Charles, similarly to 
the other characters, formulates questions, which comprise ‘prefabricated’ 
answers. She admits that she admired the lieutenant for his courage, but that she 
sometimes feels that he had nothing to do with the wreck and that he was the 
devil in the guise of a sailor. Her answer has to be considered, and can only be 
weighed in the light of Charles’s question: “Miss Woodruff, I detest immorality. 
But morality without mercy I detest rather more. I promise not to be too severe a 
judge” (F.L.W. 136). 
The question is not formulated in the interrogative; it is a statement, a 
verdict. Charles’ text implies her ‘immorality’ and although he assures her of his 
sympathy, the cruelty against which he offers to defend her is comprised in the 
very formula he employs. As Sarah employs stereotypes to construct her image 
these discussions also strengthen her ‘apartness’ from the other character, whose 
verdicts she seems to justify through her acts and thus they can merely reflect on 
her assumed status.  
Thus Sarah’s decision to abandon Charles produces uncertainty as to her 
moral worth, but certainly not with regard to her aesthetic function, a formula 
made possible by her ambiguous status. Her illogical but possible solution to 
become an apprentice to a Pre-Raphaelite painter directs our attention to her 
fictional career as a kind of ‘muse,’ and its identifiable contribution to the 
novel’s flexibility. Her status as a muse is compatible with Sarah’s ‘illogical’ 
strategies and also explains why Charles, the scientist cannot understand her 
ambitions, actions and feelings. 
Her impersonations, or masks contribute to the ‘loopholes’ in her career, -
the fallen woman, mentor of the perplexed Darwinist, mistress of the first 
existentialist, apprentice to a Pre-Raphaelite painter and above all the secret ally 
to the author god. As we have seen this strategy is visible both at the level of the 
plot and with regards to her ambiguous status. The above series of pretence 
simultaneously broadens and limits the possibilities of the characters populating 
the novel and of the fictional material itself. 
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Even the concept of a chronologically interpretable, ‘objective’ definition 
of time is dislocated and her status assumes a timeless quality. This process of 
dislocation is an essential element of the novel and the weird sense of continuity 
as discontinuity is supported by at least three variants or reflections of John 
Fowles.  
First, John Fowles is present as novelist-god who analyses both the form in 
which he writes and himself writing in this form. This novelist-god also tempts 
the ‘hypocrite lecteur’ into participation on the basis of the artist’s argument that 
we are all novelists. Second, John Fowles actually becomes a character in the 
novel because in his last two conversations with the reader he is no longer a 
narrative voice, but is a physically described character who enters Charles’s 
first-class railway carriage and has the look of an omnipotent god, a prophet. 
Later we see him loitering on the Chelsea embankment, he is rather ‘foppish and 
Frenchified’ and he is convinced that the world is his to possess. These 
variations compensate for Charles Smithson’s deficiencies, who is after all, the 
‘surrogate’ of the novelist, that is, he can be interpreted as the third variant of 
John Fowles in the novel.  
The above reflections seem to contribute to Sarah Woodruff’s superior 
status, whose freedom is reckoned to be of her own construction. When she 
explains her status to him Charles Smithson can only revolt against art and the 
New Woman. The curious thing about this situation is that she has been acting 
out her ‘supremacy’ through pretence, which is conventionally not a positive 
category but in chapter sixty, where she reveals the fact that she is a muse, she is 
honest. Charles Smithson’s reaction suggests that this final meeting makes him 
realise that the two worlds they live in are incompatible.  
Yet, in chapter thirteen and on various other occasions John Fowles makes 
it clear that he ‘also’ manipulates the Victorian world he is creating and thus, her 
right to pretend and create her fate and to manipulate those around her, Charles 
Smithson included, is asserted and approved by the author. The problem of 
honest direct communication between characters or characters and author is not 
settled in the novel. 
The question of literary influences, which support the novel, has been 
discussed repeatedly, and most critics insisted on real, interpretable elements of 
‘identity’ between John Fowles novel and the poetry of Matthew Arnold, 
Charles Dickens, Thomas Hardy and Jane Austen (Palmer 1975: 74). The spirit 
of the novel and John Fowles’ interpretation of the nature of literary influence as 
discussed in his essay on Franz Kafka leads me to reinterpret the freedom of the 
novelist’s fiction even with respect to the literary influences that admittedly 
shaped his material: 
All I want, indeed, is to keep the choices open and not see would-be 
writers self-driven into some sort of creative (more accurately, 
imitative) process whereby they feel they must stake their little claim 
and then defend it for the rest of their days. Increasingly human 
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freedom lives in human art, and we cannot tolerate- it is the one and 
only thing we must never tolerate- any outer-imposed restriction on 
artistic methods and aims. That, after all, remains very possibly the 
deepest and most paradoxical moral in Kafka’s haunting darkness. 
(Fowles 1970: 122) 
Since Sarah challenges her existence in the present with an imaginary 
interpretation of her past, the ‘outer-imposed’ concept of any past is undermined. 
This manipulation is important for her as the past could oblige her to give up her 
status as a free woman and false dictates could turn her into a Tess-like victim. 
Thus she is granted the freedom to ignore social ties and expectations and she 
consciously assumes the invisible ‘scarlet letter’, which in the inverted logic of 
the novel becomes the source of her integrity, dignity and results in her self-
conscious acts of freedom. In more pedestrian terms she understands too well 
that being bad can help her be different from other women of her social standing.  
The context of the novel encourages me to assert that she wants to enjoy the 
advantages of being bad and this is another relevant cause, which leads her to 
enact the role of the fallen woman. Sarah Woodruff is a bad woman by Victorian 
standards, and she is not only aware of her sexuality, but as the French 
lieutenant’s woman she also makes of it a symbol. Thus she deliberately 
contradicts the established social and moral attitudes of her time as a Victorian 
heroine, and also challenges the interpretation of her practices by twentieth 
century critics. I consider thus that John Fowles deliberately creates the symbol 
of the woman who has ‘whole sight’ (Fowles 1981: 35) because she is able to 
understand and manipulate the other both as the eternal man and as a member of 
the society of a given age. Her imaginative side endows her with the powerful 
talent of being humble and proud, miserable and happy, dominated and 
dominant, an emblem and a creative centre, simultaneously or alternatively.  
When she makes of her sexuality an emblem, an act, which actually 
mystifies social and private longing for joy, she dismisses the static and 
irrelevant aspects of a conventional definition of happiness. John Fowles avoids 
marriage between Sarah and Charles as a narrative solution, because in the 
Victorian context marriage could be the source of a wife’s misery. John Fowles’ 
intention is to fictionalise the power of the private domain as opposed to the 
torture-room quality of an exterior world haunted by false principles.  
It is also important to remember that, due to the emphatic role of ambiguity 
in the novel, when Sarah Woodruff projects her sexuality into a story about 
seduction she also casts herself in the role of the femme fatale. Thus she turns 
the prejudice of the world against the society that creates those prejudices and 
Charles Smithson cannot be an exception. The first existentialist is seduced by 
her and has to discover that what he understood as his free choice is actually the 
result of manipulation and Sarah is not a victim, but a seductress and ultimately 
a free woman. Her final apparition as a muse is compatible with the world of 
unhappy romance, which is the product of her creative imagination. She seems 
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to have gained new possibilities to fight against all the attacks coming from the 
exterior world because she wants to maintain the freedom provided by the 
fictional variant of her existence.  
Due to the ambiguity principle at work Sarah also challenges the myth of 
the prostitute as she has an authentic status both as a pure woman and as a fallen 
woman. The image of the fallen woman is created by her and this means that she 
‘enacts’ free authorial will. She is a character and the author’s secret sharer and 
thus she challenges historical and contemporary imagination simultaneously 
with the result that she discards her authenticity.  
This logic is an essential aspect on many accounts. First she is John Fowles’ 
accomplice, a co-author, she inhabits the imaginary world of the novel and thus 
she discards the authenticity both of the Victorian novel and of its twentieth 
century rewriting.  
Sarah can avoid becoming a victim because her figure embodies knowledge 
of earlier fictional experience and also because John Fowles is tempted to 
declare that the artist and the creative process could be interpreted as two 
interchangeable elements of freedom; the French lieutenant’s woman, the creator 
of her own image, can perpetuate the illusion of other freedoms. Thus through 
her talent, creativity and her author’s support Sarah Woodruff can evade the 
typical Victorian fate which awaits fallen women.  
In The French Lieutenant’s Woman ambiguity becomes a major influence 
and art becomes the dominant source of the conflict. John Fowles considers that 
the Victorian material should be as genuine as possible even at the level of style 
The French Lieutenant’s Woman documents the authorial intention to write a 
Victorian novel as the artists of that period could not write it. John Fowles 
reveals his intentions with respect to the contemporary novelist’s creative 
journey in the world of an old tradition: 
To what extent am I being a coward by writing inside old traditions? 
To what extent am I being panicked into avant-gardism? Writing about 
1867 doesn’t lessen the stress; it increases since so much of the subject 
matter must of its historical nature be ‘traditional.’ There are apparent 
parallels in other arts: Stravinsky’s eighteenth-century rehandlings, 
Picasso’s and Francis Bacon’s use of Velázquez. But in this context, 
words are not nearly so tractable as musical notes or brushstrokes. One 
can parody a rococo musical ornament, a baroque face. Very early on I 
tried, in a test chapter, to put modern dialogue into Victorian mouths. 
But the effect was absurd, since the real historical nature of the 
characters is hopelessly distorted. (Fowles 1969: 16-17) 
The essentially Victorian dialogue coexists with the ‘avant-garde’ narrative and 
the result is a twentieth century author’s experiment with nineteenth and 
twentieth century art. It really does not make any sense to try and impose any 
sense of hierarchy with respect to the relationship of the concepts and 
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accompanying technical and artistic solutions. It is exactly this unambiguously 
ambiguous character that gives vigour to the book. To reveal this twofold 
identity of the material John Fowles alternates the Victorian material with meta-
fictional chapters like in chapters thirteen and the last two ones. John Fowles’ 
discourse and register contribute to the dynamics of the fictional material by 
reproducing exactly the kind of tension he was writing about in the essay I 
quoted earlier.  
In The French Lieutenant’s Woman, Sarah Woodruff deceives Charles 
Smithson as she creates her own identity by way of fiction. She manages to 
manipulate all the characters of the novel aided by her mentor and creator which 
is possible in the novel through John Fowles’ two explicit and numerous implicit 
intrusions into the fictional world of the novel. The novelist-god blends 
techniques earlier employed by Henry Fielding, William Makepeace Thackeray 
and Lawrence Sterne to reveal and explain the novelist’s omnipotent status and 
at the same time John Fowles modifies them by promising a Victorian novel 
which is also ‘nouveau roman’ in style.  
Mahmoud Salami makes an instructive inventory of the different critics’ 
reactions to the presence of the Victorian element in the novel (Salami 1992: 
103-108), Malcolm Bradbury, in his “The Novelist as Impressario” (Bradbury 
1993: 174-191) explains that John Fowles’ appearance as an impressario in the 
novel is a meaningful ‘intrusion’ and the fact that he appears on the stage to set 
the clock back in order to transform the futures of his two central characters 
leads to a loss of confidence on the reader’s part and strengthens his awareness 
of the relevant status of ambiguity in the novel.  
On the basis of experience provided by some later John Fowles novels I 
consider that he attempts to pass off a ‘private mythology’ of himself, primarily 
because Sarah gains uncensored authority over her fictional world and can be 
explained as the fictional variant of John Fowles writing his novel. She 
manipulates and abandons the author’s surrogate and employs her possibilities 
discussed at a fictionally theoretical level by the novelist god. She ‘rewards’ 
Fowles as she contributes to her author’s ‘private’ authority over tradition, 
literature, legend, and myth while creating the fiction within fiction dimension, 
the core of ambiguity in the novel. Her transformation from a fallen woman into 
a muse is supported by conventional technical elements characteristic of 
Victorian fiction. The first glimpse the reader and Charles catch of her 
establishes her as a near mythical figure, who is ready to confront the power of 
the waves, the storm and her loneliness and these easily identifiable symbols of 
coexistence of nature, man and spiritual power can be interpreted as very early 
foreshadowing of her metamorphosis into a muse.  
Consequently, Sarah Woodruff can be interpreted as an artist figure who 
devises a new ‘view and rule of life’ by which she gains the right to rule not only 
her fictional existence but the fictionally real world as well. Yet, as John Fowles 
focuses on the primary importance of the human acts, conflicts and images in his 
novels, the theoretical and artistic themes formulated through self-reflexive 
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sections are subservient to his concern for the human characteristics of his 
characters.  
The Victorian Age, especially from 1850 on, was highly existentialist 
in many of its personal dilemmas. One can almost invert the reality and 
say that Camus and Sartre have been trying to lead us, in their fashion, 
to Victorian seriousness of purpose and moral sensitivity. (Palmer 
1975: 78) 
In The French Lieutenant’s Woman, John Fowles applies the fictional arsenal of 
the Victorian novel, to demonstrate that he can write the Victorian novel as the 
artists of the period could not write it. He sets out to demonstrate that the genre 
re-employed can preserve its full vigour and demonstrate its eternal youth, a 
thesis of great relevance for John Fowles’ art beautifully written in Mantissa.  
The principle of ambiguity is woven into the texture and the structure of the 
novel as the preserved integrity of the Victorian novel is visible in the style, the 
basic structure, the character realisation and the essentially realistic mode of the 
different sections of the novel, yet the overall structure contradicts the promise 
formulated by the parts. The flow of the plot proper is interrupted by the author’s 
comments on the condition of fiction or the relationship between the author and 
his characters. John Fowles intrudes into the novel to provide a traditional 
Victorian ending to Sarah and Charles’s story but at the same time he declares 
that other endings are possible.  
I consider the exceptional quality of the novel to be produced by the 
inherent ambiguity which governs the novel, the cunning twentieth century 
authorial attitude implanted into the Victorian ‘body’. The oft-quoted passage 
about the contemporary novelist’s main or ‘principal’ concern being not with 
authority but with freedom is also quite telling in this respect as it results in 
‘interdisciplinary’ diversity, which requires introspection. Sarah is the only 
authorial agent, who can guide writer, fictional writer, surrogate, the ‘hypocrite 
lecteur’ through the labyrinth, which hides the secret illusion of art writing life 
and life creating art.  
Thus the self-reflexive narrative is made into a visible process and as a 
result John Fowles’ ‘Victorian’ novel becomes a fine example of the so-called 
self-reflexive novel fashionable in the second half of the twentieth century. 
John Fowles makes of Sarah a ‘ghost’ of the past and a living presence and 
similarly the difference between the authorial and the narrative ‘I’ becomes 
subject to, occasionally visible, manipulation and the world of this novel, the 
world as real as but other than the world that is, is shown as being “at a second 
remove from reality” (Fowles 1988: 47) due to the ambiguity inherent in the 
authorial intention to both manipulate the aesthetic distance and maintain the 
illusion that life can write life and life can write art. 
However ‘democratic’ John Fowles may claim to be, the result is almost 
always that the artist’s authority as the writer of the respective piece of fiction 
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remains intact. John Fowles explains his artistic dilemmas, shares his intentions 
with us, declares the autonomy of his characters yet he retains his status as the 
author of The French Lieutenant’s Woman. Yet, conventional morality and art 
have no redemptive power in John Fowles’ novel, the humiliations and failures 
of traditional literary discourse can lead to some character’s (and implicitly 
individual’s) imprisonment in mistaken interpretations of the role and 
possibilities of ‘art and morality’.  
Sarah Woodruff’s metamorphosis from a fallen woman into the free woman 
is written into the metamorphosis of the Victorian novel into postmodern fiction 
which has the ambition to present both life and art in fiction, in a form of art 
Mantissa called very old and eternally young.  
The French Lieutenant’s Woman breaks with its openly declared and 
thoroughly constructed ‘existence’ as a Victorian novel and therefore it can 
assume the status of a novel freed of the limitations that might arise from the 
‘high art’ because the author has managed to cut the roots.  
The organising principles, which determine the structure of the plot of The 
French Lieutenant’s Woman, are embedded in the plot of the novel and the 
structure, the design and the process by way of which it is written assumes the 
same importance, or role of a fictional character. The endings, the chapters 
which discuss theoretical aspects regarding the novel as a genre are convincing 
illustrations of this thesis with regards to The French Lieutenant’s Woman. 
John Fowles’ novel assumes its status as fiction describing the value of 
ambiguity due to the ‘co-operation’ between author and character. The filming 
of the novel supports my thesis regarding the search for freedom, and the partial 
successes of this search for characters, author and fiction. John Fowles tells us 
that the novel was accepted as the basis of a Hollywood film after he managed to 
convince the producers that it is not exclusively a Victorian story. Following this 
‘incident’ Harold Pinter wrote the script of the film and a studio publicity man 
turned up in London during the filming of the novel and “demanded to know 
why nothing had been done about the novelization of Harold Pinter’s script” 
(Fowles 1981: 35). John Fowles found the studio publicity director’s ignorance 
hilarious, but I consider the incident to demonstrate the flexibility, or freedom 
inherent in the novel, and the comprehensively articulated value of ambiguity.  
Sarah Woodruff is a kind of secret sharer due to John Fowles’ thesis that 
freedom and authority are not exclusive of one another and should be thought of 
as being inclusive of different interpretations. Let me finish by quoting D. H. 
Lawrence’s essay on the morality of the novel for I consider his rationale 
supportive of my interpretation of the authorial and fictional situations I have 
discussed in this paper:  
And that’s what you learn, when you are a novelist. And that’s what 
you are very liable not to know, if you are a parson, or a philosopher, 
or a scientist, or a stupid person. … As for the words and thoughts and 
sighs and aspirations that fly from him, they are so many tremulations 
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in the ether, and not alive at all. But if the tremulations reach another 
man alive, he may receive them into his life, and his life may take on 
colour, like a chameleon creeping from a brown rock on to a green 
leaf. … The whole is greater than the part. And therefore, I who am 
man alive, am greater than my soul, or spirit, or body, or mind, or 
consciousness, or anything else that is merely a part of me. I am a man, 
and alive. … For this reason I am a novelist. And being a novelist I 
consider myself superior to the saint, the scientist, the philosopher, and 
the poet, who are all great masters of different bits of man alive, but 
never get the whole hog. The novel is the book of life. (Lawrence 
1936: 135) 
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